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Affairs of long forgotten days,
of deep antiquity the chronicles.
Pushkin (Ruslan and Lyudmila, first song, epigraph)
The paper describes the influence of politics on the life of Soviet mathematicians
in Stalin’s era 1928–1953, years that witnessed the full unfolding of the dictator’s
power. A few years following Stalin’s death are also covered. Various publications,
private manuscripts, and recollections of my own experiences at the University of
Leningrad served as sources. Leading themes include the administrative talent of
Egorov, Lusin’s School, and the genius of Kolmogorov. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
INTRODUCTION
This paper describes Soviet mathematics of Stalin’s era as seen from
Leningrad (St. Petersburg). Transferred from the Polytechnic Institute of
Tbilisi, Georgia, during the years 1928–1942, I was successively a student,
assistant, and docent at Leningrad University. My personal experiences
underlie this paper. Nevertheless, it is a piece of history of mathematics in
the 20th century rather than a memoir of my life. For two reasons, I had to
devote much attention to the mathematical life in Moscow. The original
rivalry between Moscow and Leningrad in the early 1920s turned into
Moscow’s domination and leadership of the whole country. One cannot
understand Leningrad’s mathematics without its counterpart in Moscow.
The second reason was my attraction to Moscow’s theory of real functions.
In fact, indirectly, Lusin and Kolmogorov were my teachers.
Sections 1 and 2 provide background material, reaching into imperial
Russia. In all other chapters, I link mathematical developments with the
political characteristics of periods of Stalin’s era. During the Turnabout of
1928–1932, the collectivization of the peasants and the forced speed of
industrialization were the main political events. Revolutionary, eager,
middle-level Party members such as Kolman and Leifert were given con-
siderable freedom. Sections 3 and 4 show how this freedom was used to
eliminate the old, non-Soviet leadership in mathematics. The period of
1932–1936 in Section 5 was a time of stabilization, a return of certain con-
servative and hierarchical trends. Emphasis on good education and the
establishment of new institutes of teaching and research signaled the
beginning of the ‘‘Golden Years’’ of mathematics. The extremely cruel
Great Terror of 1936–1937 victimized several particular population groups
and many individuals at random from all groups. By considerable moral
sacrifices made during Lusin’s trial at the Academy, Moscow mathemati-
cians were able to gain the Party’s trust and relative safety from persecu-
tion. This forms Section 6. However, the next section shows that the Party
mistrusted its scientists at the critical time of Leningrad’s blockade in
1941–1942. Even after victory in WWII, living conditions continued to be
hard. ‘‘Show trials’’ sprung up for newly invented types of ‘‘enemies of the
people.’’ Mathematicians had to fight new ideological battles. Section 8
ends with a description of the leaders of the mathematical communities of
Leningrad and Moscow.
Numerous descriptions from various points of view have focused on the
interplay of mathematics, ideology, and politics during Germany’s critical
years 1933–1945. In this paper, I attempt to cover a similar theme in the
Soviet Union’s Stalinist era, an investigation that has met with several dif-
ficulties. My original sources reflected a time when people did not dare to
write candidly in their newspapers and memoirs and were accustomed to
read between the lines. Certain topics were avoided outright: Some events
became nonevents, some persons became nonpersons. I hope that our
friends, the Russian mathematicians, will help to answer questions that
remain.
I am grateful for the many useful observations on the manuscript of this
paper that I received from the referees and the editors.
1. MOSCOW
The reigns of Aleksander III and Nikolai II from 1881 to 1917, politi-
cally stagnant and reactionary, with revolutionary-minded intelligentsia,
were nevertheless a time of economic growth, innovation, and cultural
flowering. In art, it was the Silver Age of Russian poetry, bringing forth
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new theaters, new trends, Chagall, Kandinsky, Stravinsky, Prokofiev, and,
much later, Shostakovich. A wave of new mathematicians came somewhat
later. At the beginning, Moscow would be hard put to prove that in
mathematics it was second only to St. Petersburg. The best professor of the
time, Bugaev, was better known as the father of the poet Andrei Belyi. His
simple investigations in number theory opened no new horizons to stu-
dents. For some time, Moscow University was better known for philo-
sophers of Orthodox Christianity who began their study with mathematics.
The mystic path of their greatest, Vladimir Solovyev (1851–1900), was
followed by many distinguished Orthodox thinkers all over the country.
Closer to earth was P. A. Florenskii (1882–1937). A contemporary and
friend of the mathematician N. N. Lusin (1883–1950), he was sometimes
called the Russian Leonardo Da Vinci. He excelled in geology, electrical
engineering, and mathematics. Ordained as a priest, his faith was strong
and naive, his goodness incorruptible.
The situation in Moscow changed with the arrival of the gifted and
active D. F. Egorov (1869–1931). He understood the importance of the new
ideas of Cantor, Borel, and Lebesgue. He contributed a basic theorem of
the new theory about the essential uniformity of the convergence of func-
tion sequences. Aleksandrov [4] recalls that Egorov’s seminars in 1912
discussing fresh mathematical discoveries were visited by the entire math-
ematical Moscow. Due to Egorov’s efforts, W. Sierpinski, a German citizen
and prisoner of war during WWI, was allowed to live and work in
Moscow, fully participating in mathematical life. After the war in Warsaw,
Sierpinski became one of the leaders in Polish mathematics. The Polish
school of set theory he founded could be considered a sister of Lusitania, as
the circle of Lusin and his students was called.
Egorov’s abilities as a leader and organizer were significant. A well-liked
administrator, he was a staunch defender of mathematicians’ interests and
a protector of academic traditions. He had several good students including
Golubev, Stepanov, Razmadze, Privalov, and Lusin. For Lusin, the most
talented of them, he recognized the necessity of the best possible foreign
contacts. He arranged Lusin’s 3-year visit to Göttingen and Paris where he
met Hilbert, Borel, and Lebesgue. Lusin would never forget France; he
often exclaimed ‘‘la belle France’’ in his far from perfect French. With his
work, ‘‘Integral and the Trigonometric Series’’ in Matematicheskii Sbornik,
Lusin earned his doctorate (the second academic degree in Russia following
the magister, later called ‘‘candidate,’’ something like our Ph.D.) and a
professorship.
From 1915 to 1917, the close cooperation of the young Professor Lusin
with his students led to a real triumph. D. E. Menshov (1892–1988)
disproved the uniqueness hypothesis for trigonometric series, showing that
there may be several series converging almost everywhere (a.e.) to the same
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function. Another student, P. S. Aleksandrov (1896–1982), proved Cantor’s
conjecture for Borel sets by showing that all of them either are countable
or have the power of the continuum. Using some of Aleksandrov’s ideas,
M. Ya. Suslin (1894–1919) found a new class of sets, much wider than
Borel sets, which possess similar useful properties. In a fourth paper, Lusin
continued the study of Suslin’s sets. In spite of WWI, all papers were
swiftly published in Lusin’s beloved journal, the Comptes Rendus, Paris.
Nobody engaged in mathematics in 1917, the year of the two Russian
revolutions. Moscow and St. Petersburg became Bolshevik bastions during
the subsequent Civil War that ended in mid-1921 when General Vrangel
was forced out of the Crimea and the Red Army of Trotsky and
Tukhachevskii was unable to take Warsaw. Conditions in the two cities
during the years of ‘‘War Communism,’’ described in Pasternak’s ‘‘Doctor
Zhivago,’’ were abominable. Not only was there widespread hunger,
but people were also forced to share living space with strangers assigned
arbitrarily by the Office of City Soviets. The population of Moscow and
St. Petersburg shrunk to a quarter of its prewar number, exactly as
happened in Leningrad during the German blockade in WWII.
For his group of Menshov, Suslin, and A. Ya. Khinchin (1894–1959),
Lusin found refuge in Ivanovo to the northeast of Moscow where a new
Polytechnical Institute was founded. Lusin persuaded rector Brelov to take
the greenhorn student Suslin as an associate professor. But Suslin got into
increasing conflict with the rector. Alienating also his teacher, he did not
take the required magister examinations [18, pp. 163–168]. Finally, Suslin
resigned and returned to his native village near the Volga. He died there
from an infection of typhoid fever.
During this time Egorov remained in Moscow protecting the university.
Aleksandrov, without Lusin’s help, was trying to prove Cantor’s hypoth-
esis for arbitrary sets, an impossible task, as we now understand. Dis-
heartened by his failure, he left Moscow for the western provinces where he
successfully experimented with staging classical plays in a local theater.
According to hearsay, he had intended to join the theatrical profession and
gave it up only because he anticipated political problems. After the peace
treaty with Poland in 1921 and the introduction of Lenin’s New Economic
Policy (NEP), conditions of life improved with the exception of housing.
Science and industry progressed. Mathematicians could return to Moscow.
In 1921, Moscow University had a great reservoir of student talent. The
years immediately following, enthusiastically described by Lyusternik [26],
were the happiest, most successful period for Lusitania.
M. A. Lavrentiev (1900–1980) and N. K. Bari (1911–1961) became
Lusin’s students. The latter, one of the best female Russian mathemati-
cians, demonstrated excellent taste; some of her discoveries predicted
greater things to come. Her theorems about superpositions of absolutely
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continuous and of monotone functions were similar to Kolmogorov’s for-
mulas for the solution of Hilbert’s 13th problem. She wrote a book on
trigonometric series, parts of which proved to be better than the ‘‘bible of
harmonic analysts,’’ the books of A. Zygmund.
The appearance of P. S. Uryson (1898–1924) and A. N. Kolmogorov
(1903–1987) on the mathematical scene was particularly striking. Beginning
with analysis, Uryson became a topologist under Egorov’s influence. He
became the founder of the Moscow topological school, and Aleksandrov
joined him. Uryson’s main achievement was the development of dimension
theory whose foundations had been laid down by L. E. J. Brouwer,
Poincaré and Lebesgue. Aleksandrov and Uryson became friends, publish-
ing several papers together—the beginning of the Moscow topological
school. The friendship overshadowed even Aleksandrov’s impending
marriage. He describes it this way [4, p. 243, 249]: ‘‘The night of March
30–31, 1921, we spent with Uryson walking the streets of Moscow. At five
o’clock we separated, agreeing to consider this the first day of our
friendship. The next development was my marriage to Ekaterina Eiges on
April 2. The marriage lasted only a few days.’’ A. R. Eiges (her brother)
loved his sister very much and felt deeply the misfortune of her family life.
‘‘[However], not once did I hear or feel [from him] a reproach in this
respect.’’
Aleksandrov and Uryson were the first Soviet mathematicians allowed
foreign travel in the summers of 1923 and 1924. The main trips took them
to Göttingen with contacts to Hilbert and Emmy Noether, but they also
visited Hausdorff and Brouwer. The devastating end came on August 17,
1924. Swimming dangerously in the surf of France’s Normandy coast,
Uryson was thrown against a cliff and killed. In spite of the immense shock
he suffered because of this tragedy, Aleksandrov’s good relations with
Göttingen and Hausdorff continued for many years. In Moscow, he soon
had his first student, the blind P. S. Pontryagin (1908–1988).
Against the rich background of talented, brilliant young mathematicians
in Moscow, Kolmogorov was particularly outstanding. He could be called
Lusin’s student but was completely able to make breakthroughs on his
own. He achieved the first one at the age of 19, in 1922. One of Lusin’s
famous problems was the invitation to prove the almost everywhere con-
vergence of the Fourier series of any square-integrable function. For a
larger class of integrable functions, Kolmogorov constructed a function
that did not satisfy this, whose Fourier series diverges almost everywhere.
The situation became clear only 40 years later with the establishment of
one of the main theorems of harmonic analysis. It was shown that func-
tions of all spaces Lp, 1 < p [., have almost everywhere convergent
Fourier series. Thus, Kolmogorov’s result described exactly the range of
validity of this theorem. Today the greatness of this result can be seen
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because (a) the proof was difficult and (b) the importance of the result
increased with time. Indeed, at first everybody believed that Kolmogorov’s
result was only a first step toward a refutation of Lusin’s conjecture,
toward the construction of a function in L2, perhaps even of a continuous
function, with divergent Fourier series.
Kolmogorov’s other major early achievement was the axiomatization of
probability theory by means of measures on the sets of elementary events.
This paralleled the complete axiomatization of geometry by Hilbert.
Kolmogorov became one of the great mathematicians of the first half
of the 20th century. His main creative period ended fairly early, perhaps
with his 1959 paper on metric entropy with Tikhomirov. He remained, in
V. I. Arnold’s terms [15, p. 68], a mathematical alpinist conquering single
outstanding mountain peaks rather than a mathematical road builder
constructing comfortable roads of access to the peaks. Sometimes he found
the best unimprovable result where nothing had been known before him,
like his solution of Hilbert’s 13th problem. At other times he produced a
seminal result, one of several possible, which exemplified and illuminated a
whole new landscape, ready for exploration. His paper on widths in 1936
was an example.
Egorov’s success peaked in 1929. President of the Moscow Mathematical
Society (MMO) from 1923 to 1930, Egorov also served as editor of the
journal Matematicheskii Sbornik. At the university, he was a well-liked and
energetic dean. At the age of 61, he was elected to honorary membership of
the Soviet Academy of Sciences together with the algebraist D. A. Grave
(1863–1939) from Kiev. At the same time, other great Russian mathemati-
cians, N. N. Lusin, I. M. Vinogradov, and S. N. Bernstein, became
members. Ideas of Cantor, Lebesgue, and Lusin were still considered a
peculiar kind of mathematics. To Lusin’s disappointment, his election
placed him in the section of philosophy.
In the Ukraine, pure mathematics fared less well. The Ukrainian Com-
munist Party decided sometime in the 1920s that only applied mathematics
was to be developed in this region. The algebraic school of Grave in Kiev
was closed; his gifted and very successful students, N. G. Chebotarev
(1894–1947), B. N. Delone (Delaunay) (1890–1980) and O. Yu. Schmidt
(1891–1956), moved from the Ukraine to Kazan, Leningrad, and Moscow,
respectively. At Kharkov, the other important Ukrainian city, the specialties
of Grave’s colleague S. N. Bernstein (1880–1968), namely approximation
theory, probability, and partial differential equations, were closer to appli-
cations. A research institute for Bernstein was planned for 1930. Unfortu-
nately, instead of being able to enjoy it, he was forced to leave Kharkov.
Nevertheless, approximation theory became a leading field of mathematics
in the Ukraine. Results of Akhiezer, Brudnyi, Dzyadyk, Korneichuk,
M. G. Krein, S. M. Nikolskii, Remez, and A. F. Timan amply attest to this.
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2. LENINGRAD
Called Sankt Petersburg in 1701 by its founding father, Peter the Great,
the city became Petrograd in 1914 until Lenin’s death in 1923, and
Leningrad until 1991. For 80% of its life, the city of my birth was the
country’s political, spiritual, and architectural center. When I returned
there in 1928, I still believed that its dialect, only slightly different from
Moscow’s accent, was the correct classical Russian.
It is said that the best mathematicians of all ages were Archimedes,
Newton, and Gauss. The fourth very well may be Leonhard Euler
(1707–1783), son of a Swiss Lutheran pastor in Basel. With an important
interlude at the Prussian Academy of Sciences (1741–1766), he spent the
beginning and the end of his (mathematical) life in St. Petersburg. In 1766,
empress Catherine the Great offered him and his sons financial rewards not
matched anywhere else. Euler worked in all mathematical fields known
at that time: analysis, number theory, variational calculus, series, and
all branches of the exact sciences accessible to mathematical methods.
A simple example of his power is Euler’s formula
e ip=−1
which connects the three basic constants of analysis: p, e, and i=`−1.
Euler’s legacy continued to live on in St. Petersburg. Soon there were
several mathematicians of world fame. P. L. Chebyshev (1821–1894)
studied polynomials of best approximation, distribution of primes in
number theory, and probability, disciplines that later came to represent
Russian strength in mathematics Some discoveries of E. I. Zolotarev
(1847–1878), who died young, could be fully appreciated only later.
Chebyshev’s students, A. A. Markov (1856–1922) and A. M. Lyapunov
(1857–1918), together with V. A. Steklov (1864–1926), were to define
St. Petersburg’s mathematical personality for a long time.
Chebyshev’s best student, Markov, followed him in the same subjects
with even more vigor and depth. In number theory, he investigated
quadratic forms; he applied continued fractions as a tool. In probability, he
and Lyapunov proved fundamental limit theorems under fairly general
conditions. Many stories about Markov were told to me by both my father
who took his courses for a year and by Markov’s son, A. A. Markov, Jr.
(1903–1979), himself an excellent mathematician. Markov the elder told his
son that Chebyshev, a well-known tightwad, died in the presence of his
doctor, clutching in both hands banknotes of three and five rubles; he
could not bring himself to hand them to his caretaker. However, it is also
known that he gave luxurious dinners for his friends.
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Markov’s lecturing was a great success, even financially. Copied by
scribes, well-bound copies of his lectures were commercially available. The
first lecture in his course would begin with the words, ‘‘Disorder is defined
as follows.’’ He would then explain that 2, 4, 1, 3 was a disorder because an
odd number of permutations was needed to transform it into 1, 2, 3, 4.
This was the beginning of the theory of determinants. Markov liked to
needle the imperial government and the Orthodox Church from his lectern.
He would compute the probability that orally circulated reports of biblical
events contained no error. After the Orthodox Synod excommunicated Leo
Tolstoy, Markov applied for and got a similar excommunication.
In his early fifties, Markov started investigating the frequencies of the
appearance of different letters of the alphabet in the Russian language,
referring to the first chapter of Pushkin ‘‘Evgenii Onegin’’ as an example.
Thus, the letter ‘‘a’’ has a certain probability in the language. It has another,
different probability if it is known to follow an ‘‘r.’’ This probability will
change again if the ‘‘r’’ is known to be preceded by a ‘‘t.’’ In general,
Markov considered a sequence or chain of events A1, A2, ..., An, ..., each
dependent on the preceding ones, this dependence becoming weaker and
weaker with distance and disappearing at some point. People thought that
this was a whim of an aging professor. Actually, this was the beginning of
Markov chain theory, a chapter of probability that has produced scores of
books, a theory indispensable in life, technology, and the sciences.
A colleague of Markov in the Imperial Academy of Sciences and his
friend, A. M. Lyapunov, is important to our history because he represented
another sphere of mathematics at the cross-section of physics, mathematics,
and astronomy richly present in St. Petersburg. His main achievements
were in the mathematical theory of stability of equilibrium or of movement
of mechanical systems. His memoir about the movement of three bodies
received a prize from the French Academy. In probability theory, he
invented the method of characteristic functions.
V. A. Steklov, another academician, was elected at the ripe age of 48.
With wide interests, he was more applied than theoretical, more organizer
than scholar. He could not offer new exciting problems to his numerous
students as Lusin did in Moscow. In good relations with Lenin after the
revolution, Steklov became vice-president of the Academy. He belonged to
many government planning committees and organized the physical and
mathematical research institutes of the Academy, the latter bearing the
name ‘‘Steklov Institute’’ to this day.
Simultaneously with the rise of Lusitania in Moscow, a generation of
outstanding talent also came forth from St. Petersburg University: A. A.
Friedmann (1888–1925), Ya. D. Tamarkin (1888–1945), V. I. Smirnov
(1887–1970), Steklov’s students, and A. S. Besicovitch (1891–1970), a
student of Markov. I found only Smirnov when I came to Leningrad in
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1928. This group was joined by Kolosov, Kuzmin, Shokhat, and also
Muskhelishvili, founder of the National Mathematical School in Tiflis,
along with Razmadze.
Toward the end of WWI, the German army threatened St. Petersburg.
Its university was evacuated to Perm, close to the Ural mountains. Many
mathematicians went along, among them Friedmann, Besicovitch, Kuzmin,
and Gyunter, returning only at the end of the Civil War. During this time,
Markov preferred to remain in a village close to St. Petersburg teaching
school. Lyapunov fled to non-Bolshevik Ukraine and died there in
November 1918.
Friedmann’s grandfather was a medic of the Preobrazhenskii regiment of
guards who protected Russian emperors, and his father a musician and
composer. While still in high school, Friedmann and Tamarkin wrote a
number-theoretic note praised by Hilbert and published in Mathematische
Annalen. Friedmann had exuberant, overflowing talents and limitless
energy. Having worked in pure mathematics with Steklov, he was attracted
to physics and the mathematical aspects of several exact sciences. He dis-
covered that Einstein’s relativity theory allowed also for universes with an
increasing or periodically oscillating rather than a constant radius. It took
time for him and one of his students to persuade Einstein to accept the
correctness of this deduction.
During WWI, Friedmann became interested in plane navigation and
construction and even took part as a pilot in the bombing of the Austrian
stronghold Przemysl. After returning from Perm to St. Petersburg, he con-
tinued his feverish activity. Working in the Main Geophysical Observatory,
he discovered his new field of specialization, dynamic meteorology, and
attracted gifted coworkers: N. E. Kochin (1901–1944), later an academi-
cian, B. I. Izvekov (1894–1942), and I. A. Kibel (1904–1970). To explore
the atmosphere, he ascended in a gas balloon to a height that achieved the
world record of that time. Friedmann also initiated a book project,
‘‘Mathematics for Physicists,’’ with Smirnov and Tamarkin; their names
appeared on two volumes. After Friedmann died and Tamarkin fled to the
United States, Smirnov completed the project in five volumes, the last one
devoted to functional analysis.
The death of the elder Markov in 1922 and Friedmann’s death three
years later can be considered the end of Leningrad’s greatness as a
mathematical center. The departure of Besicovitch and Tamarkin, who
escaped together in 1924 by illegally crossing the Soviet border, contributed
to this decline. However, other mathematicians moved to Leningrad:
B. N. Delone and V. A. Tartakovskii (1901–1973) came from Kiev, and
G. M. Fichtenholz (1888–1959) from Odessa. Even with Markov gone,
Leningrad’s main strength, unmatched by Moscow, remained its number
theory group including the academician Ya. V. Uspenskii as well as
Vinogradov, Venkov, Koshlyakov, and Kuzmin.
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The best of them, Vinogradov, was deeply introverted, a lifelong
bachelor with down-to-earth tastes. He was as strong as a bear, with a
rightfully feared handshake. Climbing under a large piano, he could lift
and balance it on his shoulders. Living near a student dormitory,
Vinogradov would be often seen participating in a volleyball game. Any
rough remark by a player who did not know him would be stopped by the
others: ‘‘Shut up, he is an academician.’’
As a beginner, Vinogradov found a simple proof of a famous estimate
that contained the integer n. He and Smirnov offered the paper to Markov
for publication. The new estimate contained an extra log n. ‘‘The logarithm
is a slowly increasing function, this is a small improvement on the old
estimate,’’ remarked Markov. ‘‘No, it is worse by this factor, not better.
However, the proof is very simple,’’ said Vinogradov. ‘‘But log n is large, it
tends to infinity,’’ Markov protested. However, he finally accepted the paper.
Vinogradov made his main contributions in additive number theory. He
completely mastered the Hardy–Littlewood approach, working with esti-
mates of certain trigonometric sums. The 250-year-old conjecture of
Goldbach, still unproved, asserts that each even natural number is the sum
of two primes, for instance, 100=11+89. Vinogradov’s weaker version of
this stated that each large odd number is the sum of three primes. He
apparently had no students working with him. Yet, at the end of the
1930–1931 academic year, he gave a lecture especially for Izya Gordon and
me explaining his theories. To his disappointment, we did not understand
much. We could not even identify which one of his lemmas was the most
important for the proof. I. M. Gelfand, after his election to the presidency
of the Moscow Mathematical Society, warned his colleagues in his accep-
tance speech against becoming pure ‘‘technocrats,’’ urging them to empha-
size good ideas, which he called the soul of mathematics. I am sure that
Gelfand did not mean Vinogradov, whose work would have been impos-
sible without excellent ideas. Nevertheless, the word ‘‘technocrat’’ seems to
be strangely descriptive of Vinogradov’s work.
At the University of Leningrad, two teachers predominate from 1928 to
1930, attracting the love and admiration of students: Smirnov and Fich-
tenholz. The first was a passionate and effective lecturer, explaining his
ideas with crystalline clarity and without excessive rigor. A student of
Steklov, he worked in many fields, from elasticity to what we now call
Hardy spaces. S. L. Sobolev (1908–1989) and I. A. Lappo-Danilevskii
(1896–1931), both excellent, were his students. Sobolev, who soon left
Leningrad for Moscow, became known for his differential inequalities and
for participating in the creation of distribution theory. He used spaces of
functions with finite Lp-norm whose derivatives are distributions: Sobolev
spaces. The spaces W rp with distributions replaced by ordinary functions
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are, by extension, also called Sobolev spaces. Lappo-Danilevskii died in
Germany, unable to complete his dissertation. His subject was the con-
struction of systems of linear differential equations with given monodromy.
As an unselfish service to mathematics, Smirnov, with the help of Kochin,
completed and published the dissertation that earned for Lappo-
Danilevskii a corresponding membership in the Academy.
The small group of Fichtenholz, Besicovitch, and Tamarkin represented
a counterpart to Moscow’s Lusitania: they studied real function theory.
Tamarkin became a valued professor at Brown University. The star of the
group, Besicovitch, obtained several famous results. He solved Kakeya’s
problem about the rotation of a needle in a domain of least possible area,
produced several deep theorems about covering of sets, and studied almost
periodic functions. At the end of his career, he became the successor to
Littlewood at Cambridge.
Fichtenholz, the only member of the group remaining in the USSR, was
more teacher and able administrator of his chair (Kafedra) than researcher.
Although he taught real functions, his most popular lectures focused on
analysis, that is, on differential and integral calculus, the university’s basic
course for the first three of five years. With silky black locks and an
Assyrian beard, immaculately dressed, he was a striking figure. His presen-
tations were logical, clear, exact, smooth, and artistic. Students admired his
wit. Here is an example. A lemma of analysis says that if an [ bn [ cn,
n=1, 2, ..., and lim an=A=lim cn, then also lim bn=A. Fichtenholz
called this the theorem of the two policemen: if two policemen walk to the
precinct, then the man between them also walks there.
Students accepted his insistence on proper behavior. In front of 200 stu-
dents, he expelled from his class the future world chess champion Spassky
for analysing games on his portable chess set instead of concentrating on
the lecture.
During WWII, Fichtenholz completed a three-volume set (2,800 pages)
of books on analysis—a ‘‘Cours d’Analyse’’ in the style of Goursat or de la
Vallée-Poussin. His was perhaps the last analysis textbook of this length
without the use of Lebesgue integration.
3. THE TURNABOUT: EGOROV AND KOLMAN
To properly understand mathematical life in 1930–1931 in Moscow and
Leningrad, one must be able to imagine the political background of the
period. The Turnabout (Velikii Perelom) of 1928–1931, also called Stalin’s
Revolution from above, replaced Lenin’s tolerant era of the New Economic
Policy of 1921–1927. The economy of NEP was based on small business
entrepreneurs (‘‘nepmen’’) and on successful peasants who had profited
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from land redistribution at the beginning of the Civil War. This half-
planned, half-market economy all but repaired the destruction left by the
Civil War. For most Party members, among them Stalin’s chief rival
Trotsky, progress was too slow to ‘‘catch up with and overtake (dognat i
peregnat) the capitalist world.’’ In addition, the peasants did not cooperate,
refusing to sell their produce at government prices.
There were struggles in the Politburo, the governing center of the Party.
At the beginning, Lenin’s line was supported by the right wing that
included Stalin, Bukharin, and Rykov and opposed by the left wing headed
by Trotsky. After the crushing defeat of Trotsky’s opposition, Stalin
borrowed from him his basic ideas of collectivization and industrialization.
In 1928, Stalin was finally able to act independently, disregarding his Party
adversaries. He realized the ideas of the left wing in a very extreme way.
At the 1930 Party congress, Stalin preordained the ‘‘advance of
Socialism on all fronts,’’ the Turnabout. The change was most obvious on
the economic front. The nepmen were eliminated by excessive taxation of
their property or by deportation. During the Civil War, the Bolsheviks had
gained peasant support and sympathy by helping to expropriate the
landlords’ estates. Now the land was taken away. Classifying peasants into
groups of poor, middle, and kulak, the Party started collectivization under
Stalin’s slogan: ‘‘Liquidation of kulaks as a class.’’ Actually, it was
‘‘Liquidation of peasants as a class.’’ Kulaks and their families were
expelled from their villages, the wealthier ones exiled to Siberia, the more
stubborn shot or sent to concentration camps. The rest ‘‘voluntarily’’
donated their land, animals, and agricultural tools to a kolkhoz (collective
farm) under administration designated by the government.
In 1929 Stalin appointed a commission of 21 important Party members
including Molotov, Yagoda, and Kossior to supervise collectivization and
liquidation of the kulaks. Fierce resistance forced Stalin to take a step
back. In his article in the Pravda ‘‘Dizziness from Success,’’ he stated that
‘‘certain comrades,’’ dizzy because of the multitudes wishing to join
kolkhozes, have applied excessive pressure to the peasants. The guilty were
identified as ‘‘malicious distorters of the Party line,’’ therefore subject to
secret police (GPU) trials. Of the 21 commission members, 19 perished [8].
It took more pressure and a winter of hunger to complete collectiviza-
tion, which became an economic failure: grain exporting Russia became a
grain importer. The injustices were never redressed.
Actually, industrialization was nurtured by collectivization. Young,
energetic country men and women, members of peasant families of all
categories, flocked from villages to cities to work in factories or to find
their educational opportunities. The social outcome was an upward
movement of a large part of the population. Workers and peasants and
their sons and daughters became white-collar workers, employees, and
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students at high schools (VUZ). An open road to high administrative posi-
tions, to directorships of various factories and institutions, beckoned the
young communists. Unfortunately for the country, this road discouraged
originality and personal moral principles. The objective of this process,
replacement of the old technical elite by people of worker or poor peasant
descent, proved to be not always possible.
Spectacular trials, trumpeted by radio and the newspapers, targeted
leading engineers of the old regime, those in mining (Shakhty) in 1928, and
those in the Industrial Party in 1930. At the trials, the accused accepted all
charges of sabotage and conspiracy. The Polish-American mathematician,
A. Zygmund, said that lies were the most repellent trait of Soviet Commu-
nism. Statements of the official propaganda, no matter how unbelievable,
were never to be contradicted; openly expressed doubts and disagreements
counted as counter-revolutionary activity and were punished by concentra-
tion camps.
How much the Party believed its own trials is seen by the example of
Professor Ramzin, director of the Moscow Technological Institute. As the
‘‘leader’’ of the officially fabricated Industrial Party, he was sentenced to be
shot as an enemy of the people, a filthy saboteur, a traitor who had dis-
cussed military intervention in the USSR with members of the French
government. However, he was found irreplaceable for the institute,
returned to his old post, and was awarded a Stalin prize for technical
achievements. Books by Volkogonov [37] and Gill [14] provide informa-
tion about the period 1928–1953.
All spectra of life in the Soviet Union were effected by the Turnabout;
mathematics was no exception. From 1915 to 1927, in Moscow it was
dominated by Lusitania, a circle of Lusin’s students. Without Lusin, there
would be no Lusitania, without Egorov, no Lusin. History is full of cases
when the rise of a historic development would have been impossible
without the preparatory work of a talented, dedicated, and energetic pre-
decessor. A famous example is the Macedonian King Philip who paved the
way for his son, Alexander the Great.
D. F. Egorov was a gifted if not a great mathematician. The years
1929–1930 were the summit of his success as the president of the MMO
and the chief editor of Matematicheskii Sbornik. The deeply religious
Egorov did not hide his mistrust of the Communist Party. This could not
coexist with the new politics of Moscow State University (MGU) and its
director A. Ya. Vyshinskii, later a harsh and sadistic prosecutor at the
three show trials in 1936–1938. In an Izvestia article calling professors class
enemies, Vyshinskii mocked statements like: ‘‘science is objective’’ or
‘‘Newton did not need Marxism to find his laws’’ [12, 38]. One could hear
the first rumblings of an approaching political storm. A group of students
and doctoral candidates attacked the content of mathematical courses
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proposed by Egorov. They criticized ‘‘Egorov’s ossification and lack of
political zeal in reforming the pedagogical and research activity.’’ Worse
was to come.
The Sixteenth Party Congress in Moscow and the First All-Union
Congress of Mathematicians in Kharkov convened almost simultaneously
in June 1930. At the Party Congress, Stalin proudly proclaimed that ‘‘The
characteristic tendency of our Party at this moment is the shift from
socialism’s advancement on certain parts of the economic front to its
advancement on the whole front.’’ This also meant the ‘‘science front’’ and
the ‘‘mathematical front.’’
The mathematical congress was planned as a showpiece of Soviet
mathematics. Egorov and Bernstein (the latter representing Kharkov)
invited foreign scientists, with Blaschke, E. Cartan, Denjoy, Hadamard,
and Montel delivering plenary addresses. Lusin was present, arriving from
Paris. On a trip to Germany and France, Kolmogorov and Aleksandrov
did not participate. A group of activists at the congress, led by O. Yu.
Schmidt, proposed a telegram greeting the Party Congress. Egorov refused
to add to it the name of the MMO. In addition, S. N. Bernstein argued
that when inviting foreigners he promised them the absence of political
pressure; therefore, they should not be offered the opportunity to sign.
After feeble attempts on his part, Gyunter, the president of the Leningrad
Mathematical Society, was silenced and the telegram sent.
Party reaction was cruel. In September, Egorov was arrested by the
GPU. In a fake trial closed to the public he received a jail sentence. Now
the Party staged protests against the ‘‘reactionary churchman’’ Egorov and
his friends, for example a declaration by ‘‘proletarian students,’’ some of
them with names later recognizable in science.
The disorganization of the MMO followed. There was a real possibility
that the society would be disbanded altogether. A letter by some first class
mathematicians, L. A. Lyusternik, L. G. Shnirelman (1905–1938), A. O.
Gelfond (1906–1968), and Pontryagin, appeared in the journal Nauchnyi
Rabotnik (Scientific Worker). Calling themselves the initiative group for the
reorganization of MMO, they put all blame on Egorov, stating: ‘‘We owe
thanks to the brilliant efforts of the GPU for uncovering the crimes of a
whole series of scientific big-heads.... Active counter-revolutionaries
appeared even among mathematicians. Professor Egorov was arrested for
participation in a counter-revolutionary organization.’’
The most serious and persistent threat to mathematicians and scientists
in general came from outside the university, from Ernest Kolman, a ‘‘Red’’
professor and member of Moscow’s Communist Academy. His actions
followed press and radio attacks on saboteurs in industry, campaigns that
culminated in the monster trials of ‘‘Shakhty’’ and of the ‘‘Industrial
Party.’’ Kolman’s article ‘‘Sabotage in Science,’’ published in the Party’s
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theoretical journal Bolshevik, attacked several leading scientists by name
calling their theories ‘‘liberal’’ (that is, not militant communist) and ‘‘reac-
tionary.’’ Egorov and Bogomolov, a writer of popular mathematics, were
named in the article. Kolman found support in the pre-WWI book of
Lenin ‘‘Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.’’ Trying to refute some argu-
ments of Mensheviks based on ideas of a minor philosopher, Mach, Lenin
uttered his famous words: ‘‘bourgeois science is in deep decadence leading
to decay.’’
If some discoveries in the exact sciences made the Bolsheviks uncom-
fortable, they tried to fight them. In physics, Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle of the quantum theory of Planck and his followers represented a
particular source of discomfort. The expanding universe of Einstein’s rela-
tivity theory seemed to imply the existence of God.
Some sciences, such as genetics, eugenics, and ecology, led to social
implications. Mendel’s laws of heredity, giving mathematical formulas
independent of exterior influence, present an example. Determined to
reform the population rapidly by state-directed education, the Bolsheviks
regarded these laws with suspicion. They supported the agriculturist
T. Lysenko who used his political advantage against the academician
N. I. Vavilov. Lysenko designed, and Vavilov opposed, a project for the
improvement of the declining grain harvests in the Soviet Union by gra-
dually moving the fields of wheat north to acclimatize the cereal to the
cold. Lysenko’s plan failed. The state destroyed the flourishing Soviet
school of genetics with strong ties to T. H. Morgan and other American
biologists. Vavilov died in jail. The voice of Kolmogorov raised in defense
of Mendel’s laws in a Doklady paper was ignored.
The book ‘‘Struggle for Materialistic Dialectics in Mathematics’’ [34] by
the Communist Academy in Moscow was a collection of articles discussing
relations between mathematics, philosophy, and history and calling on
mathematicians to adopt the dialectical materialism (or Diamat, as we
university students called it) of Marx and Engels in their research. What
were the main features of this philosophy? How did working mathemati-
cians relate to it?
Materialistic philosophy assumed the dominance of matter over ideas:
‘‘existence determines our consciousness.’’ Idealistic philosophy was teach-
ing the opposite. Thus, Berkeley and Hume asserted that the only access to
the knowledge of objects was gained through our perceptions, through our
ideas about them. Therefore, ideas of objects are the primary, objects
themselves the secondary category of reality.
‘‘Dialectics’’ was a mode of reasoning that Hegel and others before him
adopted in philosophical discussions. If we call a notion, a social class, or a
condition a thesis, then its opposite is the antithesis. Often they both exist
or are correct at the same time. Then a notion, a class, or a condition
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obtained by removing the contradiction is a synthesis. For example, we are
in a train that leaves a railway station. First, we have the sensation that it is
the station that moves past us. This is the thesis. Then we realize that it is
the train that moves: the antithesis. A synthesis would be the realization
that both statements are partly true and partly false: both the train and the
station are moving objects in the solar system. Another example: the thesis
is capitalism; the antithesis is the dictatorship of the workers; the synthesis
is a social state in which contradictions of both systems have disappeared, a
state of communism.
For working mathematicians it is difficult to decide which kind of philo-
sophy they use in their work. Do integers, circles, and lines exist in reality?
Should we consider their imperfect examples in real life as primary or our
perceptions of ideal, perfect integers, circles, and lines? In modern mathe-
matics, both the complex number `−1 and the infinite-dimensional
Hilbert space, whose points are functions, are absolutely necessary. Both
exist only in our imagination. (Complex numbers were called imaginary
numbers in the 18th century.)
Most mathematicians are stubborn in their laziness; they do not want to
answer questions. Only when they find an inquiry worthwhile do they
apply all their creative resources, small or great, to its clarification.
Mathematicians do not know or do not want to reveal what their philo-
sophy is. There are two realms in mathematics, both nebulous, veiled in
mystery, resisting understanding. One of them consists of the discipline’s
lower reaches, its foundations and its axioms. Not all questions that arise
here can be completely resolved; they can only be reduced to other, perhaps
simpler questions. To prove something, one must start with some assump-
tions. More important are the unexplored upper regions where mathema-
tics grows, where discoveries are made. In both areas, we look for new
ideas from any source.
Experience shows that dogmatic prescriptions from outside of mathema-
tics cannot help. We find examples in the book ‘‘Struggle for Materialistic
Dialectics in Mathematics’’ [34]. In a particularly aggressive tone, the
introduction, in all probability written by Kolman, attacked the ‘‘arch-
reactionary [old] Moscow mathematical school of Tsinger and Bugaev’’
who uses ‘‘analysis of continuous functions to counteract revolutionary
theories, number theory as triumph of individualism and cabalism, and
probability theory for purposeless events.’’ Following attacks on Egorov,
the introduction quoted Lusin: ‘‘Apparently the sequence of natural
numbers 1, 2, ... to infinity is not an objective notion but is a function of
the head of the mathematician who is talking about it.’’ This statement,
shared by the intuitionist mathematicians of the time, prompted Kolman to
cry out: ‘‘It is clear that the fortress of idealism in mathematics should be
conquered and torn to the ground.’’
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An article by S. A. Yanovskaya (1896–1966) in the above-mentioned
book (pp. 222–251) described the disagreement between the intuitionists
(Brouwer and Weyl) and formalists (Hilbert). She found these schools of
thought almost identical because both were based on idealistic philosophy.
The disagreements between them could not be solved within bourgeois
mathematics where theory was separated from practice. The article ended
with a warning: ‘‘To give a [sound] foundation to mathematics means to
rebuild it on the basis of theoretical understanding of the practical
problems of constructing Socialism.’’
The highest political echelons lavished attention on the Great Soviet
Encyclopedia (BSE) that began to appear in the mid-1920s. The Party
demonstrated support for mathematics by appointing O. Yu. Schmidt as
editor-in-chief, who invited articles by leading mathematicians. Evaluating
articles by Schmidt and his friend V. F. Kagan in ideological rather than
scientific terms, Yanovskaya (pp. 305–315) characterized the mathematics
section of BSE as antimarxist and idealistic, citing the omission of Engels
and Lenin at a time when the ideological struggle in this branch of
science should be particularly intense. She disapproved of Schmidt’s article
‘‘Algebra’’ as a distortion of the history of science, based on the ideas of
the German philosopher Mach (severely criticized by Lenin).
One of the main actors of the period, E. Kolman (1892–1979), an Aus-
trian citizen born into a German-Jewish family, earned his doctorate at
Prague University. Taken prisoner in WWI, he remained in Russia, joined
the Communist Party and participated in the October Revolution. He
organized attacks on Egorov in 1930–1931 and on Lusin in 1936. His high
positions in the Party culminated in heading the Department of. Science of
the Moscow Party Committee. After that department’s dissolution in the
1930s, he was jailed but eventually regained his freedom. Returning to
Czechoslovakia after WWII, Kolman apparently supported the Czech
governments even when they were opposed by the Soviets, an activity that
led to his imprisonment in Moscow for three years. Eventually, he
emigrated to Sweden. His posthumous book bears the significant title ‘‘We
Should Not Have Lived That Way’’ [19]. To me he remains an enigmatic
figure, a somber ‘‘black angel.’’
Some of the main actors were absent from the critical 1930 congress of
mathematicians, perhaps in foreknowledge of possible trouble. Lusin
returned in the second half of 1930 after two years in Paris, where he wrote
his book on analytic sets. He encountered problems in Moscow, together
with his friend Egorov. The trial of the ‘‘Industrial Party’’ of engineers
accused of sabotage triggered protests by French scientists expressed in a
letter to their Soviet colleagues. The response from Moscow indignantly
denied all charges. Egorov and Lusin refused to sign it. As a consequence,
Lusin had to abandon his professorship at Moscow University. These
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anguishing events gave Kolman the opportunity to write again about ‘‘the
counter-revolutionary Egorov and his friends,’’ meaning Lusin. Lusitania—
an astonishing, innovative development in Russian mathematics that had
propelled Moscow to the top as one of the strongest mathematical centers
of the world—ceased to exist.
Following a long trip to the Caucasus in the summer of 1929, friends
Aleksandrov and Kolmogorov established a joint home near Moscow on
the river Klyasma. Early in 1930, they left for Germany and France with
Aleksandrov continuing to the United States. Completely missing the con-
ference in Kharkov, they returned home the following year.
There is apparently no substantial documentation of the activities of
MMO between the arrest of its president Egorov and the end of 1932, but
the facts available point to serious problems. Vice-president Lusin silently
abandoned this post as he had abandoned the university. According to
Lyusternik [10, p. 7] the ‘‘initiative group’’ took over making Kolman
president in oi the society. Then Aleksandrov took this post and held it for
32 years, ceding it at the end to Kolmogorov. The Society’s journal,
Matematicheskii Sbornik, continued to appear although it struggled with
adversities, first edited by Lyusternik and Gelfond, two members of the
initiative group, then temporarily by Aleksandrov and, beginning in 1932,
by Schmidt as a long-standing chief editor. Reorganized as a new series
(N.S.), for some years the journal even paid honoraria to the authors.
I remember that for my two articles with a total length of 17 pages,
I received an amount larger than half of my monthly docent’s salary.
In the opinion of the editors of [10], the Party’s and Kolman’s hostility
toward Egorov and Lusin endangered the very existence of MMO. It could
have shared the fate of many other scientific societies in the country,
among them MMO’s sister, LMO, in Leningrad, and been shut down.
After Egorov’s disappearance and the ensuing cataclysm, the Party helped
to select, or had appointed, new leaders. P. S. Aleksandrov and Schmidt
took over, rendering many years of leadership and restoring stability.
Schmidt eventually achieved fame as an explorer of the Soviet Arctic.
Although Egorov’s achievements in forming a new Mathematics Depart-
ment at Moscow University were remarkable, he did not fit into the political
atmosphere of the Turnabout. After his arrest in 1931, he was removed from
Moscow to a jail in Kazan where he became ill and died on September 10 of
the same year. During Stalin’s era and beyond, Egorov became a nonperson
in the USSR, not to be mentioned in public addresses or in print. A long
review article finally appeared in Uspekhi [22] praising Egorov’s work and
activities but remaining silent about the date and circumstances of his death.
After 1971, only positive references to Egorov were made in the USSR.
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4. ON THE LENINGRADMATHEMATICAL FRONT
Stalin hated St. Petersburg (Leningrad), city of emperors and empresses,
this window to Europe opened by Peter the Great. He hated the wonderful
city for its classical architecture and its flowering bouquet of imperial
palaces in surrounding villages, with names like Tsarskoe Selo, Peterhof, or
Pavlovsk. (The present name of Tsarskoe Selo is Pushkin. I think the poet
would have disliked the renaming of Selo (village) to his name). Stalin
detested the independence of St. Petersburg-Petrograd, its display of
superiority toward Moscow, its poets Blok, Gumilev, Akhmatova, and
Yesenin. He despised the city of Lenin and its politicians opposing
him, like Trotsky who saved St. Petersburg from the attack of General
Yudenich, and Zinoviev, the first president of the communist Third Inter-
national. He hated the island fortress Kronstadt for its sailors revolting
when the Civil War had already been won and for his enemy, Marshal
Tukhachevskii, who stormed the island over the frozen Finnish gulf.
The political cleansing of the student body was probably much more
severe in Leningrad than in Moscow. Students who displayed anything but
communist loyalties or had politically tainted parents were expelled. One of
these students, a Jewish girl, succeeded in fleeing to the United States with
a Rand typewriter as her most valuable possession. Her experiences in
St. Petersburg made her a staunch anti-communist; her typewriter helped
her achieve fame as a writer. Eventually she took Ayn Rand as her new
name.
To prepare an attack on the LMO, the Party organized in December
1928 a group of mathematicians calling themselves ‘‘mathematicians-
materialists,’’ or even ‘‘militant materialists,’’ belonging to the Leningrad
branch of the Communist Academy that later became the Society of
Mathematicians-Materialists in order to compete with the LMO. I had the
impression that the group consisted mainly of former secondary school
teachers, only temporarily associated with Leningrad University and even
with Marxism: L. A. Leifert, A. R. Kulisher, V. I. Milinskii, V. V. Lyush,
and A. D. Drozd.
These people gradually disappeared. Only Milinskii was still active at the
University in 1941 when he was shot by the NKVD during the early
months of Leningrad’s blockade. Kulisher, appointed professor and dean,
was well meaning and kind, but not of the caliber necessary for these roles.
He would compare himself to a Kabuki theater worker rearranging the
stage with a fan in his hand indicating his invisibility. He vanished in the
second half of the 1930s without fanfare. Docent Lyush, another militant
materialist, tried to be mathematically creative. Unfortunately, his ‘‘dis-
covery’’ was a theory of functions of the argument x+yi+zj (with three
variables, x, y, z), which paralleled the theory of analytic functions of
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x+yi (with two variables, x and y). But the great founders of analysis have
already tried this generalization and found it impossible. Thus Lyush’s
construction was incorrect. After this embarrassing disappointment, Lyush
also had to go. A Leningrad-based publisher released a calculus textbook
by Drozd that became a sensation. It linked mathematical arguments with
those of dialectical materialism. None of the mathematicians in Leningrad
considered the book anything but a tentative experiment.
The leader of the mathematicians-materialists, docent L. A. Leifert, a
zero of a mathematician, was primitive, loud, aggressive, and obnoxious.
As a student, I attended some of his lectures. One was about ‘‘the
Bolshevik’s way to integrals.’’ He brought with him a German reference
book, ‘‘Hütte,’’ with many formulas and wrote values of several integrals
on the blackboard. As an explanation, he claimed that the formulas were
useful in practical computations and that their proofs were immaterial. For
some of his integrals, Leifert conducted a poll to determine whether the
audience agreed with his formula or not. Most of those attending did [27,
p. 5]. In 1929 and the spring of 1930, the Leifert group organized several
lectures under such titles as ‘‘Mathematics and the Class Struggle.’’
Leifert’s group prepared a political classification of Leningrad’s
active mathematicians. Into the rightist group they put N. M. Gyunter,
Fichtenholz, and Smirnov. Fluctuating and intermediary were Vinogradov
and the algebraist Zhuravskii. Leifert’s own circle was termed the left
group. Actually this classification assessed the professors’ relations to
Leifert rather than their political views. For example, the maligned
Fichtenholz and Smirnov rendered good service by saving the high scienti-
fic quality of the university’s mathematics. As we shall see, they succeeded
in this, but lost the battle for the LMO. Its temporary president, N. M.
Gyunter (1871–1941), was a naive and ineffective shield for others; he was
greatly helped by the academician Ya. V. Uspenskii (1883–1947) who had
recently returned from America with his new wife.
One of Leifert’s pet enemies was Professor Fichtenholz whom Leifert
called reactionary and his mathematics idealistic. In response, Fichtenholz
announced at an open meeting that he intended to work on ‘‘new ways in
the interest of the construction of socialism.’’ Apparently this annoyed
Leifert. To mock Fichtenholz, he quoted to us students a line of Yesenin
from 1924 when the poet made an effort to join the communists: ‘‘Pulling
up my pants, I rush after the Komsomol.’’ At the time of Leifert’s refer-
ence, Yesenin was already five years dead by his own hand. The Leifert
group did not fear authorities; it would lustily attack old Bolshevik
stalwarts of great value to the Party. They criticized the philosophical
position of known communist O. Yu. Schmidt for his ‘‘idealistic’’ articles in
the Great Soviet Encyclopedia or of Steklov, dead in 1926, after whom the
recently created Mathematical Institute of the Academy was named.
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In 1930, I was too young to regularly attend the meetings of the LMO.
Rumors circulated in the student body that mathematics was in serious
trouble because of the clash between the intuitionists and the formalists. To
counteract these rumors, the LMO presented a lecture on the subject.
Entitled ‘‘About the So-Called Crisis of the Exact Sciences,’’ the lecture
was entrusted to H. Müntz, a German citizen and recent arrival from
Berlin, and professor at Leningrad University. He was selected because as a
foreigner he was seen as less susceptible to Party pressure than Soviet
citizens. Moreover, intuitionism was his side interest.
Arriving at the lecture with my friend Izya Gordon, I found the entire
mathematical Leningrad present. There were many faces I did not know.
Uspenskii, on the podium, was pointed out to me. As expected, Müntz
asserted that there was no bourgeois mathematics; the controversy between
intuitionists and formalists affected only the discipline’s foundation
without creating any crisis and disturbing the work of the average mathe-
matician. A mathematician, he argued, uses neither materialistic nor
idealistic philosophy in his work.
After the lecture, Gyunter, presiding, invited the audience to pose ques-
tions. Suddenly Leifert climbed on the podium yelling insults at the LMO
and Gyunter. In vain did the latter protest: ‘‘I did not give speaking rights
to docent Leifert.’’ Many students applauded Leifert and shouted. The
meeting was dissolved. In the wake of this disastrous event, using their still
valid visas, Uspenskii and his wife left for the United States where he
accepted a Stanford University professorship offered to him by Szegö.
Was Gyunter a reactionary? We were told that he was the only professor
who did not join the Union of Education Workers. He called the interval
between the fall and spring semesters ‘‘Christmas vacation,’’ revealing
tolerance for religion. Even worse from the Party’s point of view, when the
government experimentally introduced the five-day week to replace the tradi-
tional seven days, he refused to lecture on Sundays. During the worst
hardships of the Civil War, Gyunter asked the university to provide him with
shoes in order to go to his lectures. This was a sign of protest, expressed in his
characteristic modest and methodical way. One could not imagine him posing
any dramatic opposition to something as important as collectivization.
Returning from my usual summer trip to Tiflis in September 1930, I
found the climate at Leningrad University greatly changed. A tragic
revolution in mathematics, pushed by Leifert (1884?–1938?), was in full
swing. The implication for us students started with administrative changes
and then grew ever more significant. Many subjects needed for graduation
were dropped from our program, reducing it from five or more years to
only four years. There were to be no examinations. The secretary of our
Komsomol cell, Markovets, told me gleefully that the Faculty of Mathe-
matics and Mechanics of the University (MMF) would soon become a
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mathematical ‘‘tekhnikum’’ with a program somewhat between secondary
school and university, dedicated to technical subjects. Fortunately, it did
not go that far. Nevertheless, only some 30 students remained in my class,
six of them in mathematics, the rest in mechanics. Learned Marxists,
among them B. I. Segal, presented talks about mathematics in the main
hall of our university.
A version of the story of the tumultuous year of 1931 was described in
the booklet ‘‘On the Leningrad Mathematical Front’’ [29] by Leifert and
Segal. Leifert claimed that the whole history of mathematics in St. Peters-
burg since Chebyshev was determined by class struggle. According to
Leifert, the ‘‘preaching of pure mathematics’’ by the group of Gyunter,
Fichtenholz, and Smirnov was a form of sabotage (vreditelstvo). In his
fiery appeals, Segal insisted on the use of dialectical materialism in math-
ematical investigations. Proclaiming a deep crisis at the very roots of
mathematics, he declared that capitalist science will not be able to resolve it
because it is completely alien to dialectical materialism. His demands, as
many similar ones, had the obvious defect that they gave no examples of
how to apply this philosophy. He argued that raising new cadre from men
of the working class will solve all complex problems. Turning against their
former ally, Drozd, the materialists found his calculus textbook unsatisfac-
tory, a mechanical pasting together of philosophy and mathematics, and as
such, a ‘‘discredit to dialectical materialism.’’
In February 1931, the Leifert group started to circulate a declaration
with violent accusations of, and demands to, the LMO and the mathemat-
ical community of Leningrad. In response, Gyunter acknowledged his
errors as president of the society and expressed the hope to continue to be
a useful teacher.
As in Moscow, an initiative group for the reconstruction of the LMO
was formed. It again castigated Gyunter (‘‘We must expel from our midst
reactionaries of Gyunter’s type.’’) and formulated its requirements. Here
are the main points from the group’s declaration [29, p. 38]:
The LMO has the following urgent objectives:
1. Struggle for a revolutionary Marxist world view in mathematics
2. Political education of its members for their work of the construction
of Socialism; fight all manifestations of bourgeois ideology, neutrality, indi-
vidualism, preaching of pure science; fight tolerance of religion, and idealistic
philosophy
3. Struggle to free Soviet science from the ideological prison of
bourgeois science and to influence the latter
4. Participation in the planning of mathematical work in the USSR
5. Realization of a union of mathematicians working in universities and
secondary schools
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We saw among the authors of the declaration the influential mathemati-
cians Delone, Fichtenholz, Kantorovich, Kulisher, Segal, Tartakovskii, and
Vinogradov. From Leifert’s group Kulisher and Lyush were present, but
not Leifert himself. One noticed also the absence of Smirnov, Koshlyakov,
and Zhuravskii. Nobody was involved from mechanics or astronomy.
While the LMO sank into complete passivity, the membership of the
Society of Mathematicians-Materialists steadily increased. The young co-
workers of Smirnov (G. M. Golusin and V. I. Krylov) and of Fichtenholz
(I. P. Natanson) joined. One would assume that Leifert was satisfied with
his victory, but he wanted to go farther. At a meeting of mathematician
Party members and Komsomol members with almost no professors among
them, Leifert discussed the criticism of the situation in the exact sciences by
the USSR’s Central Party Committee. At his urging the audience for-
mulated demands for the domination of Party members in mathematical
life. ‘‘Part of the old professorial body [that had been] tested [by the
Party] in practical work, should cluster around the Party core [the Party
members of the new LMO] to ensure a firm Party leadership in the
Society’’ [29, pp. 39–40]. Actually, top Party officials would never allow
Leifert’s group and its lowly Party members to determine the Party line for
mathematics.
Leifert’s downfall came in February 1932. The Communist Academy
found that ‘‘his criticism of bourgeois mathematics was superficial, he was
engaged in leftist deviations and committed gross errors in the interpreta-
tion of dialectical materialism’’ [12]. He was stripped of all his positions
including the presidency of the Society of Mathematicians-Materialists,
which was disbanded. Leifert was exiled to the University of Rostov-on-
Don. According to some reports [36], he appeared in several cities trying
to politically undermine some local mathematicians. At one such attempt,
against the geometer N. V. Efimov, Leifert was arrested and probably shot
by the KGB because of his connections with Bukharin.
Before the beginning of the war in 1941, Kantorovich circulated among the
MMF faculty a proposal to revive the Leningrad Mathematical Society.
This, and a similar attempt by Smirnov in 1953, failed. Only in 1959 did Yu.
V. Linnik succeed in reestablishing it. A mathematical society for the whole
USSR with a list of names and addresses of its members never existed. There
were not even telephone books forMoscow and Leningrad.
Leifert hurt several people seriously. According to Ermolaeva [12,
p. 383], due to Leifert’s efforts some able graduates of the university, for
example S. G. Mikhlin, were not accepted into the program of the study
for the candidate degree (the aspirantura). I had the same misfortune
because my ‘‘political face was not clear.’’ My friend I. Gordon escaped
this fate. He was accepted by Moscow University and wrote a good disser-
tation with Pontryagin as his adviser.
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Mathematics was affected by ideological controversies all over the
country. In the Ukraine, the departure of S. N. Bernstein left his school of
approximation without a natural leader. The aggression of materialists
against idealists was exemplified by the University of Rostov-on-Don
where the gifted historian Mordukhai-Boltovskoi tried to examine in depth
the interrelation of mathematical ideas, down to their conception.
Materialists found his insistence on the ‘‘necessities of our intellect’’ in his
discussion of the genesis of the calculus or of the concept of real numbers
contradictory to their ‘‘requirements of social practice.’’ Today we would
think that both approaches had their merits.
In retrospect, it appears that the impact of the critical years in mathe-
matics was milder in Moscow than in Leningrad. The meetings of the
MMO could function as before while the revival of the LMO came only in
1959. It seems that the Party found the initiative group in Moscow and its
supporters Aleksandrov, Kolmogorov, and Sobolev more important pro-
fessionally and closer to the Party line than Smirnov and Fichtenholz in
Leningrad. The best efforts of the Party were reserved for Moscow.
The two antiheroes, Kolman and Leifert, played similar roles in Moscow
and Leningrad, in spite of the considerable difference between them in
scientific competence. Both were almost forgotten by succeeding genera-
tions. Although their dismal activity paled in comparison to the atrocities
of 1936–1937, they were notable as forerunners of the Great Terror.
5. AFTER THE TURNABOUT: TOWARD THE GOLDEN YEARS
OF MATHEMATICS
The Turnabout, with its extreme revolutionary zeal, was carried out with
complete disregard for the enormous annihilation of human life it caused.
The liquidation of the kulaks was followed in 1932–1933 by terrifying
hunger in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and North Caucasus, the major
suppliers of grain to the Soviet Union. Having resisted joining the
kolkhozes, the peasants saw their entire harvest confiscated without com-
pensation. Millions starved to death. The loss caused by this nameless era-
dication of life across the peasantry was much larger than the loss in the
Great Terror of 1936–1937 when victims were individually selected for
destruction. Big cities suffered much less. Food ration cards were intro-
duced. However, I experienced no hunger in those years in Leningrad.
Prices for food and lodging were low. Medical services were free, with
doctors even making house calls.
Some annoying changes were experiments, later abandoned. All religious
holidays of the tsarist calendar, including Christmas and Easter, were
abolished. Only five free days remained: Lenin’s birthday, the October
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Revolution (November 7–8), and International Workers Day (May 1–2).
As compensation for the elimination of holidays, a five-day week was
introduced. The number of free days in the year remained the same, but
connections with religion disappeared. The free day of the week was vari-
able, determined by one’s employer. This helped factories work smoothly
throughout the year, but disrupted relationships between friends. During
the first years of WWII when the USSR was not yet involved, the five-day
week was changed to six days and finally to the old seven days with ordi-
nary Sundays. Another innovation introduced in all schools of higher
learning (VUZ) was the ‘‘brigade’’ teaching method based on educational
ideas of American and British schools. Former lectures and exercises,
declared reactionary, were replaced by the study of textbooks by groups of
4–6 students, called brigades. The professor would walk up and down the
classroom answering questions and helping if difficulties arose. Grades
were given to brigades, not individuals.
The stabilization period of 1932–1936, which continued until 1941, was
quite different from the Turnabout. Radicalism was replaced by conserva-
tism, the equality doctrine of the proletarian revolution by the hierarchical
status system of the bureaucracy. It was Trotsky in Mexico who first noted
this trend. He compared the triumph of Stalin’s Turnabout with the coun-
terrevolutionary French Termidor ending the Jacobian revolution and
eliminating the extremists Robespierre and Saint-Just. We can have only
a brief glimpse here of developments of this period at the economic,
social, cultural/ideological, and political fronts. On the economic front, the
Turnabout created a planned or command economy, replacing reliance on
the market. Considerable improvements in living conditions of the era were
highlighted by Stalin with the slogan: ‘‘Life has become better, life has
become merrier, comrades.’’
On the social front, a new respect for position, rank, and status, formerly
despised as bourgeois relics, appeared. I remember how astonished I was
seeing Molotov wearing a hat, heretofore a capitalist symbol. Ranks of
lieutenant, captain, and general with corresponding insignia were intro-
duced in the Red Army and even in the hierarchy of railway workers. My
friend A. V. Pataleev became a four-star general of railways; the people’s
commissars were named ministers. With a return to old-fashioned morality,
divorces were made more difficult. Abortions, originally the main birth
control technique in the Soviet Union, were forbidden. By not reporting
‘‘undesirable’’ events such as crime, prostitution, plane crashes, and homo-
sexuality, the media tried to make them nonexistent. Homosexuality was
sometimes used as a pretext to jail undesirable people, as was the case with
filmmaker S. Paradjanov (1924–1990), whose hallucinatory account of the
life of the Armenian poet Sayat Nova was banned in the 1970s for its
religious sentiment.
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Stalin’s era was a time of rapid upward mobility for all classes of society.
Gill [14] provides a table of the change of the population status in the
USSR for 35 years. Its last column includes the category of lishentsy,
members of the tsarist elites deprived of the right to vote.
Blue collar Peasants White collar Lishentsy
workers (%) (%) workers (%) (%)
1924 10.4 76.7 4.4 8.5
1959 59.2 31.7 18.1 0
On the cultural/ideological front, Lenin’s hate of Grand-Russian chau-
vinism, the self-aggrandizement of the purely Russian element of the
empire, was completely forgotten by Stalin. Russian nationalism was on
the rise in the mid-1930s, growing stronger with time until Stalin’s death
and contributing to the Soviet victory in WWII. This nationalism was
conservative, glorifying elements of the Russian past, and exclusionist,
downgrading the history of other ethnic groups in the USSR. It led to
ignoring the achievements of non-Soviet scientists and to the isolation of
Soviet sciences. Another feature of the period was the declining importance
of Marxism. One saw more references to Stalin’s book ‘‘Problemy Leni-
nisma’’ than to Marx or Engels.
The changes at the university, as at all schools of higher learning,
reflected the trend toward conservatism: they often represented a return to
old, prerevolutionary ways. At LGU, the brigade teaching system lasted
only a few years, disappearing without a trace. It became unlawful (on
paper) to use social origin of candidates for students or aspirant acceptance
decisions. Study at the university became very rigorous, 24–30 class hours a
week were required, with difficult examinations twice a year. As a result,
one half of the MMF students dropped out after two years. After this, the
classes stabilized, with about 1/3 of the freshmen getting a diploma after
five years (something like our masters degree). Student dedication and
morale were very high; it was a pleasure to teach. Mathematical competi-
tions for high school students (olympiads) were initiated in Leningrad in
1935. The winners were admitted to the university without entrance exa-
minations. As a result, many highly talented students entered the university
during this period.
The candidate and doctoral degrees were reintroduced in 1934. At good
schools, they were required for the positions of docent and professor,
respectively. Both degrees, awarded to older scientists for their previous
work, had to be hard won by the younger generation by the defense of a
dissertation. It was permitted to submit a dissertation without having
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a supervisor from the university. The much higher doctor’s degree was
given for several good papers or an exceptionally outstanding one. All
degrees needed the approval of the Ministry of Education. A chair or
kafedra, an administrative unit headed by a senior professor, consisted of
faculty members working in the same field of specialization. The ranks of
assistant, docent, and professor were strongly differentiated with respect to
teaching hours and salary. In 1931, assistants were responsible for 25
teaching hours a week; the others taught less. Salaries in 1936 were 500,
750, and 1500 rubles. Corresponding and full members of the Academy of
Sciences, standing above university faculties, were often teaching at uni-
versities. ‘‘One does not contradict an academician’’ was a popular saying.
There were also titles such as ‘‘honored scientist,’’ awarded by the State,
and Stalin prizes for extraordinary achievements.
Scientific research can profit from planning. The first Soviet effort for
mathematics was made at the Planning Conference for Mathematics in
June 1931 in Moscow, described in the article of ‘‘Mathematics in the
Building of Socialism’’ [28, pp. 1–14]. The recommendations of the con-
ference, based on a talk by E. Kolman, included a direct planning line from
technical institutes as users of mathematics to applied and then to pure
mathematics; development of new mathematical research institutes; and
guidelines for the preparation of aspirants. I will illustrate this through
ideas relevant to problems of mathematical analysis. The process would
start in technical institutes: the Central Institute for Aero- and Hydro-
mechanics (ZAGI) and the Geophysical Institute of Moscow, the Physico-
technical Institute of Leningrad and others, identifying a series of confor-
mal mapping, stability, and boundary value problems, essential for their
work. These problems should go to people working in applied mathemati-
cal disciplines of variational calculus, partial differential equations, and
numerical analysis, and then reach pure mathematicians. Functional anal-
ysis, to become so important in the future, was rather narrowly described
in the recommendations as giving ‘‘theoretical generalizations of a series of
topical problems of analysis.’’ Ideas from topology and abstract algebra
were mentioned as relevant.
Soviet mathematicians were warned against either conducting science for
science’s sake in an ivory tower or indulging in overly business-like activity,
restricted to practical problems (delyachestvo). Both these extremes were
characteristic of capitalist societies, we were told. The ‘‘dying class’’ of
capitalists was described as unable to plan science. With economic depres-
sion spreading in America and Europe, these statements in 1931 appeared
to have merit to us students.
The planning conference proposed new mathematical research institutes
at the universities of Leningrad and Kazan, an institute for computing in
Moscow, and a drastic increase in the number of physico-mathematical
MATH AND POLITICS IN THE SOVIET UNION 195
colleges at universities; they would also prepare teachers for the new tech-
nical institutes of higher learning (VTUZ). It was recommended that the
preparation of aspirants in mathematics be conducted only at universities.
Special admission policies to ensure a sufficient number of aspirants who
were Party or Komsomol members or of working class origin, already in
place, were confirmed.
What came of these planning efforts? The recommendations for research
institutes and aspirants were achieved and surpassed. Several large cities,
among them Leningrad, benefitted from new branches of the mathematical
institutes of the Academy. Compared to pure mathematics, its applied
branch was favored by better employment possibilities and more state
(Lenin or Stalin) prizes. But policies never went as far as the restriction of
the most important freedom for scientists, the freedom to select their own
fields of research. Thus, the Conference’s strict prescriptions for research
planning were much softened in practice.
Publication of books and journals reached a high level. Foreign books
were translated and edited. I remember a translation of G. D. Birkhoff’s
book by A. A. Markov, Jr. who made sarcastic corrections of some of its
errors. The first edition of A. Zygmund’s Trigonometric Series, 325 pages
long, had a price tag of 10.3 rubles. As a comparison, one kilo of butter
cost 30 rubles; a volume of Lenin’s collected works, 6 rubles. No wonder
that in spite of large editions, good books instantly sold out. Two journals
merit attention: Uspekhi Matematicheskikh Nauk (Advances of Mathemati-
cal Sciences) and Doklady (Reports of the Academy of Sciences). The first,
comparable only to the Jahresberichte der Deutschen Mathematiker-Verei-
nigung, published reviews of new developments in different fields of
mathematics by Soviet and, rarely, foreign experts and chronicled Soviet
mathematical life and activities of the MMO. The second journal, with a
publication run of only a few months, brought out notes of length at most
four pages. Usually the notes offered results with proofs to be published
later—important in discussions of priority in publishing.
During my time, Leningrad gained only one first class mathematician,
the elder S. N. Bernstein. He could not remain in Kharkov after his trouble
at the 1930 congress. He came to Leningrad as if through the back door,
joining the Leningrad Polytechnical Institute rather than the university.
Some mathematicians came from Germany. H. Müntz (1884–1956), the
father of Müntz polynomials came in 1929 but had to leave in 1937 because
he was not a Soviet citizen. He eventually moved to Sweden. S. Cohn-
Vossen, with attractive work in geometry at large, co-authored with
D. Hilbert the remarkable book ‘‘Descriptive Geometry.’’ Cohn-Vossen
came to Leningrad in 1934 and died after a short illness. The USSR was an
intermediate stop to America for S. Bergman and Emmanuel Lasker
(1868–1941), the world chess champion in 1894–1921. Earning a doctoral
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degree in Erlangen, Germany, Lasker was the only chess master with a
substantial mathematical education. One of his theorems was reproduced
in van der Waerden’s textbook of modern algebra. Probably based on his
creativity in chess and mathematics, Lasker was awarded an honorary
membership of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
The 1934 transfer of the Academy of Sciences to Moscow was a great
drawback for Leningrad. We lost Vinogradov and two applied mathemati-
cal academicians; Delone from LGU also went along. As always, Moscow
remained a center of attraction for Leningrad’s scientists. Similar to French
but unlike American patterns, research in the Soviet Union was strictly
centralized. Moscow became the dominant core of mathematical culture.
The possibility for professors to change universities being limited,
Leningrad had to raise its own young talent in order to prosper. During
my time, we were proud to have A. D. Aleksandrov (1912–1999), D. K.
Faddeev (1907–1989), L. V. Kantorovich (1912–1986), Yu. V. Linnik
(1915–1972), and A. A. Markov, Jr.—all of them becoming doctors and
professors early. Thus, the mathematical faculty of LGU in 1939 was
stronger than in 1928.
Volumes have been written about the achievements of Russian mathe-
maticians; I cannot even begin here to assess their work. But I will pause
for the special case of Kolmogorov. Astonishingly, he is famous as a pure
mathematician although much of his research covered applied mathematics
and probability. I think the explanation is that he started papers with
applied themes and then transformed them into pure mathematics, impor-
tant in their own right. Kolmogorov also worked in approximation theory.
I have reproduced many of his results in my books as an absolutely indis-
pensable part of the theory. Kolmogorov became one of the mathematical
giants of the first half of the 20th century, together with D. Hilbert and
H. Poincaré.
The years after 1932 are justifiably called the Golden Years of Soviet
mathematics (in accordance with the title of the book [15] edited by
Zdravkovska and Duren). Indeed, Soviet mathematicians produced
excellent work and, compared with the population at large, they enjoyed
better living conditions and higher prestige. At the same time, many of
them suffered persecution. Is this a contradiction? Some would say yes. But
looking deeper, we find a different answer. Freedom is a necessary condi-
tion for an intellectual, specifically freedom in one’s field of creative work.
Mathematicians in the Soviet Union were free to select the subject of their
endeavor. In general, they were not harassed in their work and the dis-
cipline flourished.
Had mathematics not been a favored science, useful for Party goals, the
situation would have been different. A comparison of mathematics with
poetry is revealing. After the Golden Age of Russian poetry at the
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beginning of the 19th century with Pushkin, Griboedov, and Lermontov,
the Silver Age stretched from the last quarter of the 19th deep into the 20th
century. These poets were the literary analogues of the members of the
Lusitania. Raised in imperial Russia, in Soviet times they preserved their
independence, even those, who, like Mayakovskii, allied themselves with
the Party. The book by Shentalinsky [31] covers important Russian
writers of the Soviet period describing their harrowing encounters with
NKVD.
I have selected ten poets whom I consider to be the greatest of the Silver
Age: A. A. Akhmatova (1889–1966), A. Belyi (1880–1934), A. A. Blok
(1880–1921), N. S. Gumilev (1886–1921), N. A. Klyuev (1887–1937), O. E.
Mandelstam (1891–1938), V. V. Mayakovskii (1893–1925), B. L. Pasternak
(1890–1960), M. A. Tsvetaeva (1882–1941), and S. A. Yesenin (1895–1925).
And this was their fate: three were shot or died in a concentration camp
(Gumilev, Klyuev, and Mandelstam);. three committed suicide
(Mayakovskii, Tsvetaeva, and Yesenin); Blok died in despair, broken and
disillusioned; three became internal refugees in the USSR, isolated and
unable to publish (Akhmatova, Belyi, and Pasternak). One could ask: why
was the fate of those visionaries so much more tragic than the life of
mathematicians who were persecuted but not annihilated? The Great Turn-
about brought forth socialist realism in literature, mandated, or at least
strongly supported, by the Party. It prescribed not only the form of a
literary work, but also its content—in service to Soviet political goals.
Unable or unwilling to follow these requirements, unlike the mathemati-
cians, they lacked the necessary freedom to create. Their downfall was ine-
vitable.
Both Lusitania and Russian poetry’s Silver Age had their roots deep in
pre-Revolutionary Russia, proving that at that time the country was more
than revolutionaries and inefficient, reactionary, tsarist bureaucrats, as
sometimes depicted. Lusitania’s members were educated and formed as
scientists either before the Revolution or at a time when communist
influence at the universities was still weak. But the subsequent flowering of
mathematics was the result of energetic government support. Lenin, Stalin,
and the Party had great respect for the exact sciences and mathematics
based on the naive belief that the future of communism was ensured by
following Marx’s prescriptions and having science as an ally. They con-
sidered Marxism itself an exact science. The slogan ‘‘catch up with and
then surpass the foreign countries’’ applied also to the sciences.
There were several reasons why mathematics was the Party’s favored
science: (a) mathematics offered many applications, and one could not
predict from which part they would come; all mathematical disciplines
produced them; (b) competent teachers of mathematics were required for
all technical high schools, such as the polytechnical institutes; (c) mathe-
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matics was apolitical. This is why the rantings of Kolman, Segal, Leifert,
and others about dialectical materialism had no effect. This is why
Fichtenholz and his students, Kantorovich, Natanson, and I, could conti-
nue to work in our selected fields; (d) mathematics was inexpensive—com-
puters were not yet known. A good library and ease of discussion with
colleagues were all that we required. Personal contacts within the USSR
were encouraged. The name ‘‘Golden Years’’ for all of Soviet mathematics
is justified.
6. THE CASE OF THE ACADEMICIAN LUSIN
With scoffes and scornes and
contumelious taunts
Shakespeare (Henry VI, 1, iv, 39)
The years 1928–1953 encompass three particularly violent periods of
Soviet history, each claiming millions of innocent victims: the Turnabout of
1928–1931, the Great Terror of 1936–1937, and the Second Great Patriotic
War of 1941–1945 (the first was the war against Napoleon in 1812). The
Great Terror was organized by the Secret Police (GPU, later NKVD).
Unlike the two other disasters, it was directed against a special group of the
population only, those who were suspected of harboring opinions different
from Stalin’s Party line. Its purpose was to terrorize the Soviet middle class
whose core was the intelligentsia and, by establishing the cult of Stalin, to
stabilize the dictatorship in one person. The terror was random: in a
suspect group the less prominent victims seemed to be selected without
rational justification. This way everybody was constantly afraid, making
the terror more effective. Some groups were hit hardest: higher and middle
rank military and certain Party clusters. The question remains why terror
of this extent was necessary to accomplish the Party’s purpose. Later, in
Khrushchev’s and Brezhnev’s times, similar aims were achieved by the
threat of loss of job, not loss of life.
By some counts, in one of the Great Terror’s worst years one million
people were condemned, 10% shot, the rest sent to concentration camps.
The politicians Trotsky (in Mexico) and Bukharin were killed, as were
Marshal Tukhachevskii, Babel, the author of the book ‘‘Red Cavalry,’’ and
the theatrical genius Meyerhold. The composer Shostakovich fainted in
panic when Stalin walked out of the performance of his opera Katerina
Izmailova.
Leningrad’s mathematicians did not suffer much during this period; this
was not true of physicists and astronomers. When I arrived in Leningrad in
1928, astronomers made up about one third of the large university’s college
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of mathematics and mechanics (MMF). By 1937, only two of them
remained, Ambartsumian from Armenia and his assistant. The astrono-
mers also worked in the Main Soviet Observatory in Pulkovo, a suburb of
Leningrad. Smog and a rainy climate made their trips to foreign observa-
tories at higher elevations, often initiated by the Government, an absolute
necessity. Now they had to answer for their foreign contacts. From
October to December 1936, 15 leading astronomers were arrested. In jail,
all but one signed confessions, among them the director of the Astronomi-
cal Institute, B. V. Numerov, the vice-director N. I. Dneprovskii, and the
observatory director V. P. Gerasimovich. The consequences were particu-
larly grim. The renowned Numerov was shot, all others sent for 10 years to
concentration camps and their wives exiled.
Astronomers did not qualify for a sharashka (part of a camp with better
conditions where specialists worked on some technical problems), so only
few survived. The young N. A. Kozyrev returned home much later—he was
known for his studies of volcanic activity on the moon, which earned him
an American gold medal [32].
We return to the situation in Moscow during the Turnabout. The years
1930–1931 were critical for the distinguished mathematician Lusin. Forced to
leave Moscow University, he found a niche at ZAGI in the subdivision of his
friend Chaplygin, where he wrote several long but not very profound papers in
applied mathematics. Then Lusin withdrew to the Academy improving his
position there, moving from the philosophy section, which he disliked, to
mathematics. His influence was still remarkable and his mathematical
problems inspired others, including his new students P. S. Novikov
(1901–1975) and A. A. Lyapunov (1911–1973). Lusin was investigating
projective sets, his discovery. Feeling safe, he imprudently accepted adminis-
trative positions to which he was ill suited: chairmanships of the mathematical
group at the Academy and of the Mathematical Qualification Commission.
Not fully realizing it, Lusin lived under an ominous cloud of political
suspicion. At the Planning Conference for Mathematics in 1931, Kolman
criticized ‘‘idealism as the basis of the French-style theory of functions of
Sierpinski and Lusin’’ [34]. Indeed, Lusin was known for his lack of
support of socialism, but that was not the same as an ‘‘idealistic’’ philo-
sophy underlying mathematical work. Why didn’t Kolman similarly
accuse Lusin’s students, for example Suslin and Menshov in analysis, or
Aleksandrov in topology? Probably because Kolman did not want to hurt
important and influential students of Lusin. To this hypocrisy Kolman
added political slander, referring to ‘‘Lusin’s teachers, teachers of fascist
science.’’ This meant Lusin’s French friends, E. Borel and H. Lebesgue,
called fascist because at that time France was the USSR’s main political foe.
The manuscript of Kolman’s book [18] completed in April 1936, was
sent to the publisher on July 14. The rather pedestrian text contained
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nothing new except more attacks on Lusin. Later, Kolman [19] defended
himself, recalling that Aleksandrov and Kolmogorov had read his
manuscript before its publication. Meanwhile in Leningrad, we students
discovered Kolman’s personal message hidden in his book. The first letters
of its chapters, when read in sequence, spelled out the words: ‘‘Moey
Katinke’’ (to my Katinka). She turned out to be the author’s wife. In
retrospect, this romantic gesture and his vociferous hostility to idealism
formed a strange contradiction in character.
A trap was laid for Lusin by inviting him to witness an examination in
mathematics in one of the middle schools. Lusin’s reaction to the students’
performance was positive, calling it in a letter to the editor ‘‘a pleasant
surprise.’’ At once, the school’s principal responded in the Party’s organ
Pravda, angrily rejecting ‘‘false praise’’ for an institution where, actually,
many students were very weak in mathematics. The article in Pravda
implied that by praising a weak school Lusin meant to indirectly harm the
entire school system.
The denunciation by the school principal was followed by a real smear
campaign. Between July 2 and July 16, 1936, Pravda produced eight long
articles about Lusin. He was insulted as ‘‘the so-called academician,’’ and
addressed as ‘‘gospodin Lusin’’ (a term literally meaning ‘‘sir’’ and reserved
for foreign dignitaries, but understood as insult and mockery when thrown
into the face of an ordinary Soviet man). He was depicted as an enemy in
contempt of his homeland, hiding under the mask of an honest scientist.
Lusin was condemned at meetings held as far away as Belarus. The
main anti-Lusin lecture at MGU was delivered by Mrs. Yanovskaya, a
professor of philosophy. Following her lecture, Lyusternik, Bukhgolz, and
Aleksandrov concurred with the speaker. Pontryagin remarked that Lusin
prevented publication of a very short proof by a young mathematician that
had intended to replace Lusin’s lengthy arguments. Moreover, ‘‘Lusin has
destroyed the talented Suslin’’ and ‘‘appropriated a paper of his student
Novikov.’’ Kolmogorov reminded those assembled at the meeting of
Lusin’s good services to mathematics before his ‘‘moral and political
decay.’’ Much later, in 1979, Aleksandrov echoed this double-edged por-
trayal by writing: ‘‘Lusin was for me [in 1915–1916] a man in the highest
sphere of human virtues, a sphere he subsequently abandoned.’’ Quoting
Goethe, Aleksandrov continued: ‘‘Lusin fell under the domination of
powers which seduce a man to guilt and then leave him to his bitter pain,
for no guilt remains without punishment’’ [14]. Nobody praised Lusin’s
latest book and his discovery of projective sets. According to contemporary
hearsay in Leningrad, Nina Bari and Menshov tried to defend Lusin.
Before discussing Lusin’s trial at the Academy that took place July 7–15,
1936, I will chart profiles of some of its actors.
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Lusin was born and grew up in Tobolsk, Siberia. He had a complex and
highly excitable nature. His lectures were excellent, full of new ideas,
hypotheses and suggestions for investigation. He used to charm people at
the first meeting. To his ‘‘teachers’’ Lebesgue and Borel, he showed adora-
tion, sometimes attributing to them his own discoveries. He expected
adoration from his own students. His detractors found him theatrical and
insincere. Sometimes he would praise somebody’s work that he had not
read. He had a following of devoted students but also some bitter enemies,
notably Aleksandrov and Khinchin.
According to Hardy’s classification, Lusin was a ‘‘fine’’ mathematician
(mathematician of ideas) as opposed to a ‘‘powerful’’ mathematician
(characterized by powerful proofs, for example Menshov). Sometimes he
worked too closely with his students. It is revealing to read his own account
[10, p. 280]: ‘‘When working with a student, I not only gave him a
problem but also often invented the method of its solution, for otherwise
he would not be able to continue. And after obtaining his final results, on
my insistence he published them under his own name. Sometimes I
returned to the [same] method, and used it in my own work. This often
created a very strong interlacing of [our] ideas.’’ I would add that in most
cases, the interlacing of ideas with a great mathematician is very valuable
for a student. But not all Lusin’s students were happy with the process
claiming that he overestimated the influence of his own ideas. However,
Lusin’s trial discovered no unethical conduct on his part. According to
Professor Isaak Yaglom, Lusin, in his confrontations with the Soviet
regime, often allowed himself practical jokes demonstrating the absurdity
of its essential features.
Aleksandrov’s background, stature, and attitudes were quite different.
Having enjoyed a rich cultural upbringing, he was at home with literature,
especially German, and the theater. As rumor had it, after his disappoint-
ment in Moscow in 1917–1918, he seriously considered a theatrical career
in the Western provinces and gave up the idea only because of the possi-
bility of political problems under the Bolsheviks. Extremely ambitious, he
befriended two of the best Soviet mathematicians, Uryson (who died pre-
maturely in 1924) and Kolmogorov. With Uryson, he published joint
papers and founded the Moscow topological school. Aleksandrov was
popular in Germany, where he had many friends. He was a good lecturer, a
witty raconteur, but his status as mathematician was definitely below
Lusin’s. A strange antipathy, even hate, separated him from his teacher. In
his speeches, Aleksandrov liked to offer charades, daring the audience to
decode them. Talking at a colloquium in Leningrad during 1936–1937, he
mentioned that sessions of the Academy in which he participated were
immortalized by Pushkin’s verse. In the audience, the meteorologist Kibel
and I exchanged knowing glances. Aleksandrov had alluded to Pushkin’s
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ambiguous epigram about the hapless prince Dondukov-Korsakov, one of
the Academy’s presidents. The epigram alluded to homosexual relations
between the prince and the minister of people’s education, S. S. Uvarov.
Another actor in Lusin’s trial was the interrogating commission of the
Academy chaired by vice-president G. M. Krzhyzhanovskii, an old
Bolshevik. The commission’s membership changed somewhat during the
trial’s five sessions. Pro-Lusin were only the three mostly passive mathe-
matical academicians, namely Vinogradov, Bernstein, and A. N. Krylov,
the first absolutely silent at the trial, the second an outspoken Lusin
defender. Anti-Lusin forces actively engaged in the proceedings were
headed by MMO’s president Aleksandrov. Three members of the 1930 ini-
tiative group, Lyusternik, Shnirelman, and Gelfond, were joined by
Khinchin, Sobolev, and the academician O. Yu. Schmidt. Kolmogorov
attended only one meeting. His presence rather than his largely insignifi-
cant questions addressed to Lusin provided moral support to Aleksandrov.
It is essential to note that, except for Schmidt (Party member) and Sobolev
(Komsomol member), none of the mathematicians in the commission
belonged to the Party.
Lusin’s faithful students remained outside of the investigation, including
Menshov, Lavrentiev, Lyudmila Keldysh, Novikov, Lyapunov, and Nina
Bari. Anti-Lusin influence outside the trial was provided by L. Z. Mekhlis
and Kolman, the first as editor-in-chief of Pravda which had initiated the
hunt for Lusin and published several articles with ‘‘scoffes and scornes and
contumelious taunts’’ for Lusin, the second submitting his book with anti-
Lusin defamations [18] for publication during the trial. At the time,
Kolman headed the Science Department of Moscow Party Committee. By
their denunciation of Lusin to the highest authorities (Stalin and Molotov),
Kolman and Mekhlis tried to bring about a severe outcome of the trial. On
the other hand, Aleksandrov, one of the orchestrators of the trial, probably
expected a milder outcome. Otherwise, his assertions that Lusin had made
no anti-Soviet statements could have damaged his relations with the Party.
In the background, always prepared to strike, worked the GPU/NKVD.
They had prepared compromising materials about Lusin. His friend, P. A.
Florenskii, mathematician, engineer, and orthodox priest, arrested in
February 1933 together with a friend, was broken by the GPU. They con-
fessed to belonging to the Party for the Rebirth of Russia, invented by the
secret police, with a future government including Lusin as foreign minister
and another mathematician, the academician Chaplygin, as prime minister
[31, pp. 101–123]. This material with potential deadly consequences for
Lusin was never used.
To understand Lusin’s trial at the Academy, one must forget analogies in
American and West European legal practice. There were two types of trial
in the USSR. The secret and speedy ones by the GPU/NKVD were based
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solely on the confessions of the accused obtained by torture, threats to
family, or statements by other broken accused, for example, in the cases of
the Pulkovo astronomers or the group Rose–Koshlyakov. The show trials
were reserved for particularly important ‘‘enemies of the people,’’ for
engineers of the Industrial Party or the leading Party members of the
Trotskist–Zinovievist Terrorist Center. The accusations and confessions
were steadily broadcast by radio and newspapers, loudly supported by
mass meetings organized by the Party throughout the country, and con-
firmed at the trial by the accused eager to pile guilt on themselves and each
other. The proceedings were fully published by the media.
Lusin’s trial was neither of these types. The media behavior was that of
the show trials, but the proceedings were secret. The secret police was not
involved and the charges were not formulated in terms of the criminal
code. Of course, Lusin had no lawyer to represent him. Usually he was
called in for the second part of a session to defend himself and answer
questions. The records of the trial were believed lost or destroyed by
members of the interrogating commission. Only in 1993 was a stenographic
copy of the proceeding unearthed by the eminent historian A. P. Yushke-
vich. After his death it was published [10] by S. S. Demidov and B. V.
Levshin with a wealth of additional material and commentary.
The trial was a response to the second of Pravda’s articles published on
July 3, 1936, ‘‘On enemies behind a Soviet mask.’’ Leaving aside the direct
insults, the accusations might be summarized as follows: (a) Lusin gave
positive recommendations to undeserving people, even recommending pro-
fessorships or doctoral degrees for them, with the purpose to pollute the
faculties of universities; (b) Lusin published poor papers in the Soviet
Union and his best ones abroad; (c) his best papers were not independently
written but contained results appropriated from his students, in particular
from Suslin and Novikov; (d) Lusin tried to keep young talent from the
Academy; (e) Lusin tried to hide and disguise his anti-Soviet beliefs;
( f) Lusin was connected with the bleakest tsarist ideology based on
monarchism and Orthodox Christianity.
The article compelled the Academy to take action. Its presidium
proposed the following reply. Acknowledging the validity of Pravda’s
accusations, the Academy should recommend to remove Lusin from his
two important chairmanships and either consider his expulsion from the
Academy (the harsh alternative) or warn him that his behavior was
incompatible with membership in the Academy and that in case of conti-
nuance expulsion might follow (the milder alternative).
It is not known what happened next. Events developed with lightning
speed. Four days after publication of the crucial Pravda article, the
interrogation commission was appointed by the Academy; the first session
of the trial took place on July 7. It was a victory for the ‘‘progressive wing
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of Moscow mathematicians’’ and for Aleksandrov, president of the MMO,
that Kolman was excluded from the interrogation commission. Indeed,
Kolman’s repeated claim that Lusin’s sets were inspired by idealistic philo-
sophy because they did not exist in material reality could have been applied
to the work of all members of Lusitania regardless of their ideological
persuasion.
The first session of the trial opened with Bernstein paying homage to
Lusin’s immense service to Soviet mathematics, but his voice was drowned
out by the choir of the young assailants. This often groundless aggressive-
ness increased, climaxing at the third session on July 11. The most acrimo-
nious and biting denunciation was voiced by Aleksandrov with passionate,
one would say, perverted, anger, with the evidence presented in a way most
unfavorable to Lusin.
On the morning before the second session on July 9, another lead article
appeared in Pravda, ‘‘Traditions of servility.’’ Directed at all Soviet
scientists, it focused on mathematicians as an example: ‘‘While Lusin
published his papers abroad as a form of sabotage, also Aleksandrov and
Kolmogorov, Bernstein and Khinchin did this, forgetting their national
pride and Soviet patriotism. New scientific centers are established in coun-
tries like Poland and Holland, putting the USSR at a disadvantage.’’
Members of the interrogatory commission mentioned in the article had to
accept these accusations and promised to improve their behavior.
Even before Lusin was called in, the third session began with a dan-
gerous attack on him. The Academy’s code that allowed expulsion of its
members based on activity harmful to the USSR served as background. In
Sobolev’s words: ‘‘In our broad democracy, all important issues are dis-
cussed by the people. [Thus] we can consider here measures such as
expulsion without [the permission of] the Ministry of Interior’’ [meaning
NKVD]. Supported by Khinchin and made more precise by Segal, this
statement was voted into a resolution by the commission in Segal’s for-
mulation: ‘‘In recent years, Lusin’s activity caused harm to Soviet science
and the Soviet Union’’ [10, pp. 129–130]. This wording was extremely
dangerous for Lusin because it meant the transfer of his case to the
NKVD.
At this session, Lyusternik criticized Lusin’s departure from MGU and
his recommendation letters written for undeserving people. The expression
of gratitude by Suslin to his teacher: ‘‘To him [Lusin] I owe the idea
behind my results’’ [35] was interpreted by Aleksandrov as written
under pressure by Lusin. With Lusin protesting in vain and Suslin dead,
Aleksandrov ended the session with these words: ‘‘I do not believe you....
Before your appearance, we talked with much less passion. Your
presence... creates the impression of complete insincerity. You harm your-
self by your petty defense’’ [10, p. 174].
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To the fourth session, commission chairman Krzhyzhanovskii brought a
set of instructions from the Kremlin introduced by the unmistakable
manner of Stalin: ‘‘Yest sovyet’’ ([here] is advice). The instructions implied
that Lusin’s vilification should continue by adding more details and
examples. However, the main message of the directive was relatively
harmless in the sense that it saved Lusin from a concentration camp. Prais-
ing the commission’s official resolution, Stalin actually ‘‘advised’’ essential
changes in its text. Charges against Lusin should be formulated in the
commission’s ‘‘academic language’’ rather than in the style of Pravda.
Segal’s legally damning words in the original resolution should be changed
into a nonlegal phrase calling ‘‘Lusin’s behavior unworthy of a Soviet
scientist and incompatible with the dignity of a Soviet citizen.’’ Thus
Lusin’s official image was transformed from criminal to socially undesir-
able. The Kremlin’s instructions also absolved Lusin from the charge of
plagiarism. The fifth and last session was almost completely Bernstein’s act.
With the conclusion of the trial already set and the proceedings secret,
Bernstein and A. N. Krylov, newly arrived, devoted the entire time to
Lusin’s defense.
This is how Pravda’s main accusations were ultimately answered by the
trial: (a) undeserved recommendations given. This was largely accepted by
Lusin and his defenders with the stipulation that they were given to less
than significant people and did not lead to any important appointments;
(b) plagiarism. This accusation was not endorsed even by Stalin. Lusin
never tried to expel Suslin from Moscow as Pravda alleged but provided
him with an associate professorship in Ivanovo where Suslin went on his
own volition. There Suslin resigned either because of lack of interest,
according to Lusin, or because of sickness [17]; (c) anti-Soviet attitudes.
Aleksandrov stated twice during the trial [10, pp. 61, 97] that no evidence
existed to validate this charge. (Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Lusin’s
sympathies were anti-Soviet—his love was with France); (d) publications
abroad. With a snarl for his tormentor Kolman, Lusin explained at the
trial that several Soviet newspapers had published Kolman’s statements
that his [Lusin’s] theoretical investigations were harmful, advising Lusin to
work on practical problems. Lusin continued: ‘‘This I did, publishing a
series of papers in the Soviet Union on applied matters, not my strength.
I sent my theoretical work abroad in order to avoid polluting Soviet
mathematics’’ [10, p. 144]—a good example of Lusin’s ironic style. Lusin
showed considerable courage by this statement since Kolman was still
holding his positions in the Party. Only after Kolman lost them, in 1938,
did Shnirelman and Gelfond, themselves anti-Lusin, attack Kolman’s book
[18] by a devastating review in the Uspekhi.
For Aleksandrov, the trial was a victory over Lusin and, with equal
importance, over Kolman with his ‘‘Diamat.’’ A third victory at the trial
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was, according to Lyusternik’s statement, [10, p. 151], the acceptance of
the value of purely theoretical sciences without immediate applications.
Aleksandrov, firmly established in mathematics by his own work as well as
by friendship with that giant of Russian science, Kolmogorov, obviously
had Stalin’s trust and approval. As president of MMO he was the leader of
the progressive wing of young mathematicians who more than counter-
balanced for the Kremlin the conservative wing of Lusin’s friends. The
foundation for the Golden Years of mathematics in the USSR was
complete.
The trial is an excellent resource for further research. For instance, it
allows us to convincingly answer the question: ‘‘Who discovered the ana-
lytic (or Suslin) sets and the corresponding set operation?’’ [24] As the
editors of the proceedings disclose, in 1938, L. G. Shnirelman committed
suicide immediately after a visit to the NKVD [10, p. 8]. Perhaps this is an
indication that the secret police had tried to break into the small group of
the Academy’s mathematicians.
Lusin died in 1950, but not before a final violent collision with
Aleksandrov and Kolmogorov. In 1946, the Academy had to elect a new
group of members, this time with preference to the applied sciences. This
allowed Lusin to vote against the topologist Aleksandrov. To everybody’s
consternation, as a reaction, Kolmogorov slapped Lusin’s face on the floor
of the Academy. The president of the Academy, S. I. Vavilov, was at a loss
of what to do. Finally the incident was reported to the Kremlin. It was said
that Stalin was not astonished. ‘‘This happens even among us,’’ was his
reply. In other words, Stalin recommended to do nothing. But the
Academy did. Kolmogorov lost all his administrative positions; in particu-
lar, he was fired from the directorship of Mathematical Research Institute
of the MGU.
Lusin’s splendid service to mathematics remains unaffected by time,
political changes, and cultural trends. Without him, there would be no
Lusitania as we know it. His book [25], not acknowledged at the trial,
significantly contributed to the discipline. He had many brilliant ideas and
was able to bring them to his students who enthusiastically followed him.
But his breakthrough power was not as great as that of his best students.
Some, in particular Kolmogorov, were able to overtake him in creativity.
In the tradition of great teachers, he had every reason to be proud of his
circle.
The decades of 1930–1950 must have been a bitter disappointment for
Lusin. His audiences dwindled and then vanished; the importance of his
publications diminished. The loss of Lusitania was probably his saddest
experience. However, the impact of Lusitania survived him. In Russia and
abroad, he is recognized as one of the brilliant lights of Moscow mathema-
tics and as one of the initiators of the Golden Years.
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‘‘Lusin cases’’ were tried also in other cities. With the involvement of the
NKVD, they all had tragic endings. In 1933, the German mathematicians
Fritz Noether (brother of Emmy Noether) and Stefan Bergman left for the
Soviet Union. In Tomsk (Siberia), they published their own German lan-
guage mathematical journal. Bergman escaped to the United States, to
Stanford, but Noether was arrested and accused of ‘‘suspicion of espio-
nage.’’ This category of the official criminal code, making suspicion a crime
[8, p. 285], drew a standard eight-year sentence. Noether was sent to a
concentration camp where eventually he was shot.
From 1936 to 1940, I paid only sporadic attention to events outside of
mathematics at the university. I had my own personal problems. In 1937,
my father, Rudolf F. Lorentz, a professor of railway engineering at the
Polytechnical Institute in Tbilisi, Georgia, was arrested and accused of
‘‘suspicion of espionage.’’ Sixty-five years old and sentenced to concentra-
tion camps, he soon died there. Therefore, I knew little about the persecu-
tion of Yu. A. Krutkov (1890–1952), a gifted mathematical physicist. His
life showed what happened to excellent scholars who earned the Party’s
disfavor but were found irreplaceable.
Shortly after receiving my university diploma, I met Krutkov in the Insti-
tute of Meteorology where he worked. I was impressed by his immaculate
manners, his profound, original knowledge, and the interest he took in my
work. In his youth he belonged to the circle of the physicist–mathemati-
cian–astronomer A. A. Friedmann who died prematurely in 1925. Krutkov
worked in the broad area between mathematics, mechanics, and physics,
one of his specialties being statistical mechanics. He visited France and
Germany on a Rockefeller stipend. It was he who helped Friedmann con-
vince the doubting Einstein of the correctness of his teacher’s theory about
an expanding universe. His best students were G. A. Gamov, a famous
Russian physicist who defected to France, and V. A. Fock, a professor of
Leningrad University who also had to taste the bitterness of the concen-
tration camp. Arrested in December 1936, Krutkov spent the years
1937–1939 in a dreadful camp. His conditions improved during his work
with the plane designer Tupolev and then in a secret institute at the Black
Sea with a German Nobel laureate on problems of atom decomposition. In
1947, he returned home to LGU, still under a dark cloud and with his
health ruined. However, for his last work he was awarded a government
prize in the days before his death.
7. LENINGRAD DURING THE BLOCKADE
Both dictators, Hitler and Stalin, detested St. Petersburg (Leningrad).
I have described Stalin’s dark, bitter images of this unrivaled city. Hitler
carried his own resentments. We can imagine that he was again and again
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reminded of Russia’s power under Peter I in the 18th century and of the
splendor of Catherine II’s imperial court that left Prussia and Berlin in its
shadow. The only sculpture of a military leader seen today in Frederick II’s
palace Sans Souci is the bust of Sweden’s soldier King Karl XII, the unsuc-
cessful adversary of Peter. Hitler must have remembered also that during the
Seven Year War, Frederick several times stood on the brink of an abyss,
saved only by the inconsistencies and whims of Russian imperial policy.
First, Empress Elizabeth, allied with Austria, was Frederick’s enemy. Then,
astonishingly, the half-mad Peter III, Frederick’s admirer, became an ally.
Catherine’s neutrality finally led to peace. When German armies reached the
outskirts of Leningrad in early September of 1941, Hitler considered several
contradictory plans of what to do with the city’s population of three million
in case of surrender. One of his plans was to raze the city to the ground and
transport the remainder of its population south, into the area of Russia
already occupied by him. This was a fantasy, impossible to achieve.
June 22, 1941, marked the beginning of the Soviet–German war with the
invasion of the Soviet Union by the German army. Due to the earlier
lightning-fast victories, the Germans had first a tremendous psychological
superiority. The distance from the German border to Leningrad by air was
450 miles, yet German artillery hits on the LGU buildings were recorded
on September 21. In early fall the Germans had a real chance to take or
isolate Leningrad. Their units penetrated some suburbs, but had to be
withdrawn to strengthen the German army’s concentration on Moscow.
Nevertheless, the Germans held a narrow strip of land ending at Shlis-
selburg, where the river Neva leaves Lake Ladoga. Consequently the only
connection of Leningrad to the rest of the Soviet Union was by boat across
Lake Ladoga, or on truck over the ice in the winter, and then by railway
from Volkhov to Moscow. The situation depended upon the attitude of the
Finns, only 50 miles north of Shlisselburg, and at war with the USSR. By
pushing south, the Finns could easily have set a siege, rather than just a
blockade of Leningrad. However, the Finns preferred to keep their promise
of the 1920s never to endanger Leningrad. Also, the Germans could have
cut the Volkhov–Moscow railroad line. They had succeeded in doing this at
Tikhvin, from where they had to retreat a month later.
Leningrad was in a desperate situation. The population, three million at
the beginning of the war, shrunk to 700,000–800,000 in the summer of
1942. At least 850,000–950,000 died of starvation; others were evacuated
[30, p. 685]. Many scientists still remained in Leningrad. In the midst of
the suffering, they hoped for help from the government that did not come.
Instead, the NKVD made sure that people were more afraid of their own
police than of the Germans.
I had my own encounter with the secret police. Each large Soviet institu-
tion had an NKVD office. I knew that room at the LGU through a
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woman who worked there as a courier. She got railway tickets for profes-
sors for an additional 30 rubles, eliminating the dreaded waiting in line
often for a couple of nights. I was to become acquainted with the room’s
more sinister function when in October 1941, during the blockade, I was
asked to report there. Two men were waiting for me. One had the uniform
of junior lieutenant of the NKVD. The other, in civilian clothes, watched
our conversation in silence. After some trivial questions, the lieutenant said
that they needed my help. He asked whether I knew anybody who favored
the surrender of Leningrad to the Germans.
At that moment I remembered my father on a fateful day in May 1906
during the 1905–1906 Revolution when the minister of transportation
asked for his help to suppress the restless railway workers. He refused, the
bloodshed was avoided, and he lost his position as the chief engineer of the
little railway and the possibility of state employment. I felt I had to emulate
his attitude. I knew I walked along an abyss and decided to walk to its rim
as close as possible. I should not show fear, should appear to be frank.
I answered ‘‘yes.’’ ‘‘Is this a woman?’’ ‘‘Yes.’’ ‘‘How old is she?’’ ‘‘Seventy
years old.’’ At that time I had no real person in mind, but I hoped that the
NKVD did not arrest very old women. I would have been in trouble had
the lieutenant insisted on details, but he did not. He simply pressed further
his demand for information, this time about my university friends, suggest-
ing I talk with them about such matters. ‘‘I cannot do this, I would be at
once discovered,’’ I said. ‘‘So you do not want to help the NKVD?’’
‘‘I want to help you, but not in this way.’’ He gave me pencil and paper:
‘‘Here, write down what you just said.’’ I wrote ‘‘I want to help the
NKVD, but not in the way suggested, because I would betray myself. I am
asking the NKVD to assign me another job.’’ Then I looked up and said
‘‘You probably know that my father was arrested and sentenced. Do not
think that I am responding this way because of him.’’ ‘‘Of course, you are.
And if you are sent to the front, you will shoot your comrades in the
back.’’ After some pause, I said, ‘‘No, I would not.’’ ‘‘Of course, you
would.’’ To this I did not reply. Then the lieutenant gave me his
name (which I do not remember) and ordered me to come next Thursday
to his office on the Liteinyi Prospect (the headquarters of the Leningrad
NKVD) at 4 p.m. Instructing me to keep our conversation secret, he let
me go.
On the next Thursday, at 3 p.m., I found myself a few blocks from my
home, undecided. I still had time to see the lieutenant. Suddenly, air raid
sirens screamed: German planes were approaching. I ran to the nearest
shelter. This was a cellar without a door, one could see the planes through
the open entrance. People shouted that I was attracting bombs, should
hide. But I was happy. The alarm solved my problem. I had an excuse for
not showing up at the lieutenant’s office.
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For a couple of weeks I was convinced that ‘‘they’’ would come for me.
Later I heard that one should obey only written summons of the NKVD.
My friend Boris Platonov told me of a similar experience before the war.
Somebody came to his apartment in Tiflis asking him to become an infor-
mer. Thinking this a joke, Boris vigorously helped the individual to
descend the wobbly stairs from his third floor apartment. Two hours later
a policeman came to take Boris to the local precinct. ‘‘Take him and lock
him up!’’ shouted Boris’ earlier visitor who was sitting at a desk. However,
after a couple of hours of solitary confinement, my friend was released
without harm.
Were the NKVD’s suspicions justified? Nobody in Leningrad would
speak openly about capitulation, not even to best friends, fearing the anger
of the NKVD. Moreover, during the winter, broadcasts of German rever-
sals made patriotic feelings run high. People were thinking less of the city’s
surrender.
According to an article in the Soviet tabloid Ogonyok [16] by May 1942,
127 Leningrad scientists were arrested. Most died in jail. Mathematicians
suffered from the activity of the informer (stukach) Markulov. During the
blockade, his first victims were assistants of LGU, Milinskii and Verzh-
bitskii. I recall my meeting with the latter just before his arrest when he
told me that his family ate their cat for dinner. Then came the ‘‘group of
V. S. Ignatovskii.’’ The elderly Ignatovskii unwisely advertised his German
connections, calling himself W. von Ignatowsky in his publications.
According to Solzhenitsyn, Ignatovskii was accused of contacts with
Germans during WWI, when he supposedly accepted an assignment as a
mole and then waited for the next war between the two countries. He, his
wife, and docent Artemyev were shot on November 4, 1941 with two
others. But Professor K. I. Strakhovich from the same group was not
executed. Beaten and tortured, he was starved by withholding his meals.
Through Strakhovich’s case 13 other mathematicians, the group
Rose–Koshlyakov, were discovered. It included N. V. Rose, dean of the
Mathematical-Mechanical Faculty of LGU, counter-admiral of the Soviet
Navy, and author of many textbooks; N. S. Koshlyakov, corresponding
member of the Academy; and Professors B. I. Izvekov and A. M.
Zhuravskii. I knew all of them personally. Koshlyakov and Zhuravskii
were my teachers. Izvekov and his family were close friends with the family
of my wife Tatyana Belikov. They were sentenced a few days after Tatyana
and I were evacuated from Leningrad across the ice of Lake Ladoga.
The article in Ogonyok [16], the NKVD report provided to the family of
one of the victims [9], and [21] are my sources for the trial of the group
Rose–Koshlyakov. They illustrate very well the standard (by no means
worst) practices of NKVD during the blockade. The main purpose was to
obtain signed ‘‘confessions’’ from the accused as proofs of their guilt.
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Among other charges, the mathematicians were accused of (1) formation of
a large group of professors in order to spread anti-Soviet lies and defeatist,
slanderous rumors among the population; (2) preparation of a friendly
reception of the German army in case of Leningrad’s fall and joining the
Germans in the struggle against the Party and the Government; (3) delay of
their own evacuation from Leningrad as long as possible to carry out their
plan. The time of the group’s formation was given as July–August 1941. In
light of Germany’s impressive successes at that time, to some a Blitzkrieg
resulting in the fall of Moscow and Leningrad seemed probable.
The trial was conducted by a junior lieutenant of the NKVD, Kruzhkov,
on April 23–25, 1942. In his confession, Rose said: ‘‘I did not accept the
Soviet government. I did not agree with the organization of the kolkhozy
and with the fast tempo of industrialization, deeming these reforms to be
premature.... I am the leader of a counter-revolutionary organization,
which originated in the counter-revolutionary surroundings of Professor
A. A. Friedmann.’’ Indeed, the group of the talented physicist–mathemati-
cian Friedmann, who died prematurely, was scientifically active throughout
the revolutionary years, with many good mathematicians including Rose,
Smirnov, Tamarkin, A. S. Besicovitch, Krutkov, Koshlyakov, and Izvekov
participating. But their activity was not political in nature. The communists
considered the group reactionary because they were unable to forget that
Tamarkin, Besicovitch, and Krutkov’s famous student Gamov fled the
Soviet Union.
By April 1942, after seven hungry months, the accused were suffering
from acute starvation; many of them had lost 1/3 of their normal weight
and were close to death. It is humanly understandable that an offer of a
bowl of soup was sufficient to force them to sign a ‘‘confession,’’ an ulti-
mate proof of guilt. Forced to stand for hours was another form of torture.
No wonder that Koshlyakov signed: ‘‘I intended to establish relations with
the German commandant.... I would like to atone for my guilt, be it in a
small measure, by participating in our working front.... In particular,
would be very happy to complete my work on summation formulas which
I have been conducting for 30 years....’’
All 13 of the group, assembled in a room, heard their death sentence.
Then they were left alone. They fell on one of them who, they believed, had
betrayed them by his confession. The unfortunate man was saved by
Izvekov, son of a priest, who pleaded for mercy. A few days later all death
sentences were replaced by 10 years in camps. The older men soon died,
Rose in jail, Izvekov on his way to a camp. The only woman, Polosukhina,
was released. The younger and stronger ones, Koshlyakov, Strakhovich,
and Zhuravskii, good mathematicians, survived in special camps
(sharashkas) for working on war-related problems. The rehabilitation
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process went particularly well for Koshlyakov. In the camp he wrote two
good research papers which prompted his recall to Moscow at the end of
1944, where he was allowed to work in a construction bureau on practical
problems. In February 1953 he received a Stalin prize and a medal. His
sentence of 1942 was repealed in 1951. All others in the group of 13 were
rehabilitated in 1954, after Stalin’s death, when most of them were dead.
Only Strakhovich and Zhuravskii were able to return to their positions in
Leningrad. The sentences had also included confiscation of all private
property of the condemned. The families lost most of their valuables and
relics including art objects, which remained in the possession of state-
owned museums even after the repeal of the sentences.
Were the accused sympathizing with the Germans? We have no means to
know. It is possible that they preferred a German victory to the continua-
tion of the Stalinist regime. Later, as the treatment of the Russian popula-
tion by the Germans became widely known, such feelings diminished. We
can assume also that a change of mind would occur (or had already
occurred in April 1942) with the appearance of the United States as a
powerful military ally to the USSR and the success of the Soviet defense of
Moscow in the winter 1941–1942. But few intelligent people expected
serious political improvement in case of a Soviet victory.
I assumed that the group of 13 in their meetings discussed ways of
finding food, and of the political or military situation, but without the
Party’s supervision. The Party was not really afraid of single individuals,
but could not tolerate any group not initiated or supervised by it. This was
possibly the reason of my survival, although, in the eyes of the NKVD,
I was probably as ‘‘guilty’’ as the group of 13. But I had few close friends,
and the ones I had, Markov, Natanson, Platonov, and Pataleev, were
above suspicion politically. So I was allowed to be evacuated to the
Caucasus.
It is possible that the information the NKVD wanted from me related to
the unfortunate group of 13. Had I agreed to be an informer, I would have
been forced to spy on my friends, acquaintances, and teachers or suffer
disastrous consequences. I even suspect that the junior lieutenant who had
interrogated me was the same Kruzhkov who later falsified the confessions
of Leningrad’s mathematicians.
8. AFTER WORLD WAR II
After the war, the Mathematical-Mechanical College of LGU was
rebuilt, with many members returning from evacuation. The fate of others
gradually became known to the scientific community. Many were lost,
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some through the 1941–1942 trials. Gyunter died quietly in 1941 before the
beginning of hostilities. Zhitomirskii, Yanchevskii, and some others died of
hunger. Ya. S. Besicovitch, the brother of the outstanding mathematician
A. S. Besicovitch, disappeared without a trace, as far as I know; I edited his
approximation theory book in 1939–1940. Only G. M. Golusin (1906–
1952) remained in Leningrad during the blockade and in spite of his poor
health produced an important book on the geometric theory of analytic
functions.
Mathematicians connected with the Academy, Bernstein, Markov, and
Linnik, were evacuated individually, the latter after an idealistic escapade
into the people’s militia (opolchenie) until he was extracted from there by a
demobilization order given from above. Two groups were evacuated in
order to preserve the teaching potential of the college. One, led by V. I.
Smirnov who was made a regular member of the Academy on this occa-
sion, moved to Yelabuga, some 500 miles east of Moscow. Later in the
winter of 1941–1942, the group around Fichtenholz relocated to Saratov.
At LGU, the faculty was treated according to the inherent hierarchy.
Even in the war’s bleakest years, people with degrees received preferential
consideration. Holders of a doctor’s degree were exempt from military
service; candidates were sent to the front only as officers. Young candidates
who had acquired a lieutenant’s rank during their studies were treated
fairly well. S. M. Losinskii (1914–1986) taught during the war at an air
force academy. The injured N. P. Erugin (1907–?) [13] and the pilot S. V.
Vallander (1917–1975) survived. The two brothers of my wife, an engineer
and a geologist, ended the war as colonels. However, candidates with the
designation of common soldier in their military passport were often politi-
cally suspect and caught in a strange situation—nobody wanted them. I
was one of them and ended up in Leningrad’s paramilitary Air Defense
Corps. Much worse was the fate of aspirants and students who had no
degree. Most of them volunteered for the people’s militia for the defense of
Leningrad. Ill trained and equipped, these regiments sustained enormous
losses. Mathematics lost many highly gifted aspirants including Sirvint,
Yudin, Maslov, Meier, Liberman, and Olovyanishnikov. After the war,
LGU suffered further losses. Kuzmin died in 1949. Bernstein left for
Moscow very early, perhaps he did not even return to Leningrad after
the war; Markov followed him in 1959. Organized by mathematicians
Lavrentiev, Sobolev, and Kristianovich, the new Scientific Center
Novosibirsk in Siberia attracted many talents, in particular during its peak
years, 1964–1971, when A. D. Aleksandrov and Kantorovich went there.
The interests of Kantorovich, who was awarded the Stalin Prize in 1949 for
his work in mathematics, had turned to mathematical economics already
before the war. He explained his main ideas in 1939 in the modest brochure
‘‘Mathematical Methods of Organization, and Planning of the Production
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Process’’ and in his main work, ‘‘The Best Use of Economic Resources,’’
written in 1942. He discovered linear programming and used it to obtain a
scientific basis for optimality in economics. N. A. Voznesenskii, one of
Leningrad’s Party leaders, read both manuscripts and recommended them
to Stalin. Moscow’s economic experts, strict Marxists, condemned them.
The book, published in Russian in 1959, and in English in 1965, earned its
author a 1975 Nobel prize [7].
I remember meeting my friend I. Natanson during the blockade on the
Palace Bridge of Leningrad. He was about to cross the frozen Neva on his
way to the university; I walked part of the stretch with him. At that time,
with the German army on the defensive and America our new ally, victory
seemed imminent. I talked about my expectation that it would bring
improvement into our lives, but Isidor was pessimistic. And he was right.
Freedom had no chance as Stalin started to send Soviet soldiers who had
been German prisoners to concentration camps.
On the ‘‘political front,’’ cleansings of the Party membership followed
one another. Why did Stalin need to order a new purge shortly before his
death? With the country quiet, and relations with the West fairly tolerable,
he could have complacently looked forward to the festivities of his 70th
birthday. However, during 1949–1950, he engaged Malenkov to start the
trials of the ‘‘Leningrad anti-Party organization.’’ The leaders were A. A.
Kuznetsov and N. A. Voznesenskii. The first, before his transfer to
Leningrad, had been the secretary of the Party’s Central Committee—one
of several positions within the Party second only to that of Stalin’s.
Voznesenskii was a gifted economist and Stalin’s adviser, while his brother,
A. A. Voznesenskii, served as the war time rector of LGU. Altogether,
about 2,000 Party members were arrested, about 200 of them shot. At the
trial, some of the accused did not meekly succumb to the accusations but
declared their innocence and loyalty to the Party [37, vol. 2, p. 464].
Stalin invented a new type of enemy of the people: the ‘‘homeless cos-
mopolitans’’—people who spoke a second language or had an additional
cultural background and thus were suspected of easily changing their
allegiance. Jews fit this definition perfectly. There are indications, sup-
ported by the following story, that toward the end of his life, Stalin
planned a new purge of the Party and of the Jewish population. It is well
known that after the war the USSR was the first to recognize the state of
Israel. Israel’s future prime minister, Golda Meir, was a celebrated guest,
feted and courted in Moscow. Mrs. Molotov, with a maiden name
Perelman, was invited to participate. She befriended Mrs. Meir and even
took her to Moscow’s synagogue. But Israel selected the United States
instead of the Soviet Union for its main ally. Mrs. Molotov was arrested
for Zionist sympathies and exiled to Kazakhstan. Her husband reacted
exactly as was expected from a good communist. He did not protest. This
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might have been the beginning of Jewish or Party persecution. The depth
and rage of Stalin’s anti-Semitism, especially during his final years, are
dramatically represented by the transcripts of the trial that took place in
1952 [33].
In the cultural-ideological sphere, after the victory the strengthening of
both conservative and nationalistic trends and further isolation of Soviet
sciences continued. This is how the editors of Delo Lusina [10, pp. 13, 43]
describe Stalin’s ideas in this report: Soviet sciences should be centralized
[with center Moscow], ideologized [by Marxism–Leninism], and rendered
controllable [by the Kremlin]. University students were taught that Soviet
science was a leader, the avant-garde of world science. This was also what
the Party hoped to achieve. But Stalin’s direct intervention in the sciences
made this impossible: in biology, because of Stalin’s protégé Lysenko and
in linguistics because of Stalin’s own ‘‘scientific’’ contributions. In other
fields, results were not much better. However, mathematics, the favored
science, almost achieved the Soviet goal; the USSR became the world’s
second in this discipline, after the United States, while the defeated
Germany lost its leading position.
A strong factor in the postwar rise of mathematics in Soviet society was
the beginning of nuclear bomb construction. A very substantial salary
increase for mathematicians ensued. Nevertheless, if one would classify
countries according to the size of salaries in this field, the order would be
the following: (1) United States, (2) Germany, (3) USSR. With respect to
the status of mathematicians in the population, this order would be
reversed: (1) USSR, (2) Germany, (3) United States.
For Stalin, ‘‘writers [were] engineers of human soul.’’ He also cared
about Soviet art, but in a different way. In 1946, Stalin’s adjutant A. A.
Zhdanov gave a stern lecture to the cultural elite of Leningrad. He accused
writers and musicians, among them Shostakovich and Prokofiev, already
famous in the West, of formalism and neglecting the requirements of the
‘‘socialist realism.’’ He called the poetess Akhmatova a ‘‘half nun, half
harlot’’ concerned only with personal matters and condemned the ‘‘vulgar
parodies’’ of the great writer Zoshchenko, popular for his short stories
describing the lives of ordinary Soviet people.
During the war, there was no time to discuss ideological problems in
science. In prewar years, attacks by the hack T. Lysenko had cost many
distinguished geneticists their lives. At a session of the Agricultural
Academy in 1948, he renewed his attacks using the slogan: ‘‘Science is
enemy of chance [read: of probability theory].’’ Anybody responsible for
anti-Lysenko statements in the past had to ‘‘confess his sins’’ and to
withdraw his words. Bernstein, whose manuscript of the 4th volume of his
collected works contained applications of Mendel’s laws refused to change
his text. The book was suppressed. Kolmogorov also suffered. Eight years
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earlier he published in the Doklady an article ‘‘On a new confirmation of
Mendel’s laws.’’ Now he had to publicly retract it. Another case when
Kolmogorov was forced to act against his principles occurred later in his
and P. S. Aleksandrov’s joint letter to the daily Pravda in February 1974,
about the dissident writer Solzhenitsyn:
NO PARDON FOR TREASON
We learned with deep satisfaction that Solzhenitsyn has been deprived
of Soviet citizenship and bounced out of our country. Soviet intelligentsia
are characterized above all by their high civic consciousness, feeling of
duty to people and state, respect for traditions and emblems of the people
and pride in the high achievements of the Soviet people building commu-
nism. In his creations, published in the West, A. Solzhenitsyn blackens
our social structure, desecrates the memory of those fallen in the battles
of the Great Patriotic War and purposefully gives a distorted picture of
the life of Soviet people. In his way he not only violates Soviet laws but
also trespasses in the inner sanctum of our people. He has put himself
outside of our society. Such persons have no place in our country.
P. S. Aleksandrov, A. N. Kolmogorov
After the war, ideological problems started again to plague Soviet scien-
tists. Lysenko, Stalin’s protégé since 1935, was the main speaker at the
1948 meeting of the Soviet Agricultural Academy. He was trying to estab-
lish his own brand of ‘‘dynamic Darwinism’’ which denied the existence of
competition among members of the same species, the cornerstone of
Darwin’s theory of evolution. He invented derogatory names, like
‘‘Mendelists’’ and ‘‘Morganists,’’ for geneticists who dared oppose him.
They lost their positions and were lucky to retain their lives.
This controversy highlights Stalin’s personal involvement in exact scien-
ces and his attitude toward them. Stalin carefully read and edited
Lysenko’s manuscript, eliminating several pages. He replaced everywhere
the epithets ‘‘bourgeois, [capitalist]’’ and ‘‘soviet’’ for biology and genetics
by ‘‘reactionary’’ and ‘‘scientific,’’ respectively. Particularly important for
us was Stalin’s reaction to the statement: ‘‘Any science is class-oriented by
its very nature,’’ namely: ‘‘Ha, ha, ha!! And what about mathematics? And
about Darwinism?’’ [6, pp. 249–251]. Nevertheless, Stalin welcomed
Lysenko’s main ideas. His approval made them part of Party dogma,
models for imitation in other sciences. Indeed, after Lysenko’s triumph,
Party ideologues planned a series of conferences matching the biological
session of 1948.
This plan was carried out in medicine, linguistics, and chemistry. Next
should be mathematics, with A. D. Aleksandrov as the main speaker, and
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physics. They were abrogated by L. Beria, at that time chief of Atomic and
Missile Projects (and minister of the Secret Police for many years), since
influential physicists explained to him that this may damage these projects.
The material for the mathematical session was then published as a set of
three volumes [3]. This was a new version of Kolman’s book [18] with
almost the same title, intended to explain mathematics from a ‘‘correct’’
point of view, this time written by highly competent mathematicians. In its
1964 English edition, Aleksandrov’s introductory chapter on philosophy
was omitted.
A. D. Aleksandrov, the rector of LGU and a gifted geometer, has
described his troubles [27, pp. 49–52]. A letter addressed to the mathema-
tics group of LGU asserted that set-theoretic disciplines such as topology
were based on bourgeois philosophy. As usual, discussion sessions were
held in the university’s main auditorium. The idea that set-theoretic
methods were idealistic found little support and was replaced by the secre-
tary of the Party cell by the accusation of ‘‘formalism.’’ In particular,
abstract investigations by A. A. Markov seemed to fit this label. Alarmed,
Aleksandrov traveled to Moscow to look for help. As a solution, I. M.
Vinogradov proposed the above-mentioned books. This was probably the
best approach possible while Stalin was still alive.
Cultural politics of the Stalinist era led to isolation and nationalism in
Soviet mathematics. As we know, already in 1931 the editors of the new
series of Matematicheskii Sbornik invited Soviet mathematicians to use
their journal in preference to publication abroad. Ambitious young
mathematicians seeking international fame did not respond to this invita-
tion, continuing to send their best work abroad. This custom was not
ended by the wishes of the Soviet mathematical community, as A. D.
Aleksandrov [2] insists, but by Pravda’s article ‘‘Traditions of servility’’ in
1936. Directors of research institutes were held responsible for the enfor-
cement of the publish-in-Soviet-journals rule, exempting only results
obtained by Soviet scientists while on leave abroad. Another exception was
a dispatch of several Soviet mathematical papers to the United States as a
sign of friendship following the attack on Pearl Harbor. With few excep-
tions, these papers were published in excellent U.S. journals. The paper of
my friend I. Gordon on what is now known as Gordon rings appeared in
Annals of Mathematics, but for a long memoir by L. V. Kantorovich about
his semi-ordered (K)-spaces a reduction of length was proposed and the
author decided a Russian journal for its publication.
Collegial relations with foreign mathematicians were often disrupted.
This led to curious and unfortunate cases. A French mathematician,
Favard, published certain formulas in the bulletin of his society in 1937.
The Ukrainians Akhiezer and Krein found very interesting consequences
and published them. However, Favard’s paper had a continuation in the
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next issue of the bulletin, with exactly the same results. This would never
have happened if Akhiezer and Krein could have simply sent Favard a
letter. They probably knew that correspondence with a foreign scientist
could endanger them.
The farther into the forest, the more the wood, says a Russian proverb.
Soon articles for Russian journals would be acceptable only if written in
Russian, even by foreigners. As a next development, tables of content and
abstracts in foreign languages were forbidden. A whole new industry of
translation of scientific journals into English began to flourish in the
United States. With a year’s delay, one could read the translation of any
important Russian paper.
Authority to grant permission of foreign travel for scientists was trans-
ferred from Soviet diplomatic services to the Party’s Central Committee.
Soon two categories of scientists emerged: ‘‘traveling’’ (vyezdnye) with
foreign travel possible, and a much larger category of ‘‘non-traveling scien-
tists.’’ Those who went abroad usually had a small hard currency
allowance and a tight timetable disallowing. any sightseeing or visits to
friends. A secret political supervisor was attached to important travelers or
large delegations. Organizers of western conferences had trouble inviting
Soviet participants because after original acceptance, they would often
cancel their visit at the last moment under the pretext of work overload at
home.
Each scientific community needs leaders respected for their position,
scientific achievement, and prestige. The Party was keenly aware of this
and the necessity to have people of trust in these posts. In the exact sciences
at my time, the Party was usually unable to find potential leaders in its own
ranks. In Leningrad, Professor V. I. Smirnov, later elevated to Academy
membership, was not a Party member. Of crystal-clear honesty, deeply
religious, he was still favored by the Party. Even his refusal to sign the
declaration of Leningrad’s ‘‘initiative group’’ did not harm him. Helped by
Kochin, he selflessly completed, edited, and published the unfinished
manuscript left after Lappo–Danilevskii’s death in Germany. He sent part
of his honorarium to the United States to the ‘‘traitor’’ Tamarkin, co-
author of two of Smirnov’s books. He never joined or opposed an
ideological trend or made advantageous compromises.
Another leader in Leningrad was A. D. Aleksandrov, rector of LGU
before 1942 and in 1952–1964, a Party member with unconventional
points of view. Defending a scientist accused of ‘‘idealistic’’ statements,
Aleksandrov suggested that Lenin also had, at one time, criticized similar
statements because they ‘‘may lead’’ to idealistic philosophy. However,
continued Aleksandrov, Lenin did not use the words that such statements
‘‘must lead’’ to idealism. Aleksandrov argued that, consequently, the
opinion of the scientist in question should be judged on its own merit. At
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that time, it was refreshing to find such arguments in print. Students liked
Aleksandrov, who was an excellent alpinist and athlete, calling him by his
patronymic Danilych. They even joked that he gave the highest grades to
those who could make headstands. One can fully understand his problem-
atic situation if one remembers that the energetic A. A. Voznesenskii,
rector of the university during Aleksandrov’s absence, lost his life as a
result of the 1950 purge of Leningrad’s Communist leaders. After Stalin’s
death, Aleksandrov became one of the Party’s enlightened philosophers of
science with a Marxist point of view. He protected Einstein’s relativity
theory that was still under attack. As the university’s rector, he played a
key role in its de-Stalinization. By 1957, he supported the reestablishment
of the academic area of Soviet genetics [7].
It is remarkable that both important universities, LGU and MGU, had
mathematicians as their longtime rectors, A. D. Aleksandrov in Leningrad
and I. G. Petrovskii (1901–1973) in Moscow. Two obvious leaders in
Moscow were P. S. Aleksandrov and Kolmogorov, and later I. M.
Gelfand, the first as the president of MMO and Kolmogorov’s friend, the
second because of his scientific achievements. But there were more MMO
members whom the Party could trust. It is interesting to compare the
information prepared for Stalin by the NKVD about the characters of the
great mathematicians Kolmogorov and Vinogradov, almost complete
opposites of each other: ‘‘Kolmogorov is widely known in the USSR and
abroad. Hard working, he has a firm and quiet character and a strong will.
Having the ability to attract talented students, he pays great attention to
their scientific education. He does great work in examination and in the
preparation of programs and textbooks for the secondary school. Excep-
tionally modest in his life, he enjoys well deserved respect. Vinogradov is a
mathematician with a global name. Unsociable, unacquainted with other
fields of science, he has great authority only among mathematicians. A
bachelor, he uses great quantities of alcohol’’ [5]. One can see from these
profiles that Stalin was interested in the characteristics of individual
Academy members.
Stalin trusted Moscow mathematics, at least those in the ‘‘progressive
wing’’ because they helped him after Egorov’s arrest in 1930, and again in
1936 when Lusin was persecuted. But why did he trust Kolmogorov? I am
not the first to hypothesize that his ‘‘trust’’ was based on blackmail. The
book ‘‘Golden Years’’ [15, pp. 129–153] contains an intriguing article
about Kolmogorov by one of his best students, V. I. Arnold (1937–).
Omitting passages that do not directly relate to our subject, we find state-
ments about the relationship of Kolmogorov to the Party and to Stalin:
‘‘ ‘‘Sometime I will explain everything to you,’’ Kolmogorov would say
each time he would act in a way that clearly contradicted his principles....
Kolmogorov regarded [his] hope that arose in 1953 [after Stalin’s death]
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as the main reason for the success of [his] work. Like most people of his
generation... he feared ‘‘them’’ [the Party] to his last day.’’ Nevertheless,
‘‘Kolmogorov spoke about Stalin with gratitude... because [Stalin] forgave
him his brawl [at the Academy after Aleksandrov’s failed to be elected].’’
Then comes Arnold’s conjecture about Kolmogorov’s hint at feeling the need
to explain his out-of-character actions: ‘‘Apparently he was experiencing pres-
sure from some kind of evil genius whose influence was enormous (well-
known mathematicians had the role of a link transmitting the pressure).’’
Who was the ‘‘evil genius?’’ Stalin? And who were the ‘‘well-known
mathematicians’’ who mediated the pressure to Kolmogorov? His friend
Aleksandrov? While there was and is definite gossip concerning the nature
of possible blackmail, it never rose above gossip. Yet blackmail of some
sort must have been involved. How else to explain Kolmogorov’s constant
support of Aleksandrov, their joint letter to Pravda about Solzhenitsyn, the
public retraction of his article about Mendel (political behavior contrary to
his known beliefs), and several strange passages by different authors in
‘‘Golden Years’’ [15]?
The Moscow school of real functions and set theory had started with
Egorov at the beginning of the 20th century and ran its course with the
solution of Hilbert’s 13th problem by Kolmogorov in 1957. With its roots
in tsarist Russia, this important strain of research was carried on succes-
sively by Egorov, Lusin, Kolmogorov, and their numerous students and
followers. (It was continued by Gelfand with his functional analysis.) In
spite of the persecution and harassment by the Soviet government that
these three leaders suffered, they helped to establish the Golden Years, a
period of quiet work and good conditions for the mathematicians of
Moscow and the Soviet Union. It is impossible to describe the significance,
depth, and beauty of the contributions of these heroes to mathematics. I
have attempted to do this in an article [23] for a small but important part
of Kolmogorov’s work. A recent book [20] offers an account of the whole
range of the creativity of this great mind.
The Golden Years of Soviet mathematics continued long after 1931.
According to some sources [15, pp. 220–222] they ended only in 1968
when relations between the Party and the mathematicians at MGU
soured because of the persecution of A. S. Yesenin-Volpin (son of the poet
S. Yesenin), a mathematical logician and a dissident, and subsequent pro-
tests by mathematicians at the university.
Maybe it would be more accurate to assume that the Golden Years were
doomed at the beginning of the mass exodus of Russian mathematicians.
The first wave consisted of Jewish scientists leaving for Israel and the
United States The next massive movement, maybe still in progress at a
slower pace, was prompted by the opening of all former Soviet borders.
One might say that the Golden Years of Soviet mathematics began with
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one kind of freedom, the choice of one’s research fields, and ended with
another kind of freedom, the choice of one’s country. And so a very signi-
ficant phenomenon of Russian cultural life came to a close.
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